Dudek: In the presidential election, it pays to compete for the leaders of smaller parties [talk]

krytykapolityczna.pl 4 months ago

Jakub Majmurek: Do we have a well-designed function as president in the Polish Constitution?

Antoni Dudek: I gotta say, how this problem was solved by the Polish constitution, a highly critical attitude. We have chosen a alleged mixed strategy that is trying to combine solutions with 2 basic democratic systems: parliamentary-office and presidential. In this first government, the Prime Minister heads the Prime Minister based on a majority in parliament, the head of state has a purely symbolic function – the UK can be an example. In the latter, as in the United States, the president brings together the full executive power, he is not only the head of state but besides the head of government.

We have a strategy in which executive power belongs to the government parliament, but at the same time we elect a president in the general election, which gives him a powerful political mandate. At the same time, there are no real affirmative powers behind this mandate, the president cannot form politics, but he can only effectively block a government with a simple majority in the Sejm through veto law.

Which frequently simply means paralysis of the state. present we have a government with a clear majority in the Sejm who, alternatively of making real changes, is waiting for the president to change due to the fact that there are no three-fifths to reject his veto. And if there is no change to the current majority, then the clinic will last at least until the next parliamentary elections.

When the PRL ran out, we had no office as president. In the late 1980s, where did the thought of going back to this institution come from, after almost 40 years of break?

With the desire to strengthen the position of General Jaruzelski and to defend against the upcoming strategy crisis. The ideas to reconstruct the office of president and safe Jaruzelski's power, not as the first KC Secretary of the PZPR, but as a constitutionally appointed head of state, have been appearing since the mid-1980s and are returning during the circular Table.

Jaruzelski team She then took the initiative to make the office of president with very strong powers, but elected by the National Assembly. The solidarity side wanted general elections. He could not agree to this due to the fact that he realized that the election of Jaruzelski as president in the general election was unlikely. However, as Kiszczak and his negotiating people believed in Magdalena, with the appropriate construction of the National Assembly – guaranteeing 65 percent of the seats for the PZPR and its allies in the Sejm – the choice of Jaruzelski will be almost certain.

As we know, these calculations have not full checked, as there has been a revolt of satellite parties, the ZSL and the Democratic Party. Jaruzelski yet passed with 1 voice, thanks to the support of the Solidarity Representative.

How much competence did president Jaruzelski have?

Very significant. Among another things, he could dissolve parliament if he felt that any bill he had adopted or even a resolution threatened his competence. These were defined in the revision of the Polish People's Republic Constitution of April 1989 very widely and in general, as ensuring interior and external safety of the state. In fact, Jaruzelski could have dissolved Parliament on any pretext.

But he never exercised that prerogative. Jaruzelski's choice made his presidency, although constitutionally powerful, prove to be truly very weak, remaining in the shadow of the Mazowieckie government.

However, there was a conflict in the solidarity camp between the Mazowiecki squad and the Welsh environment. And this conflict was decided to be settled through the organization of the general presidential election. So in 1990, alternatively of another erstwhile folk democracies, we organized a full free parliamentary election, which would take the function of a constitution, we organized ourselves the first presidential games. Without reasoning about the long-term consequences in September 1990, the election of the president was included in the Constitution through general elections, but while maintaining the parliamentary-office form of government.

Do we know who is specifically liable for the general presidential election in 1990? Was it a quest to velocity up the Wałęsa? Or is he a kind of his political brain, Jarosław Kaczyński?

Kaczyński did not want a general presidential election in 1990 – here came the first crucial political difference between him and Wałęsa. Kaczyński felt that Jaruzelski should resign, which would be a sign of acceleration, and the current National Assembly would then elect the interim president, who would become Wałęsa. Subsequently, a full democratic constitutional election should be organised, which would find the future system.

That didn't like Wales. He wanted a direct presidential election due to the fact that he knew he was gonna win it. And Kaczyński had no chance in 1990 to push his imagination against Wałęsa and against the Mazowiecki camp – and the second made the final decision. And his key players – Bronisław Geremek, Aleksander Hall, Adam Michnik, Jacek Kuroń – were convinced that if there were to be presidential elections, it should be common. Mazowieckie was possibly the least convinced of this, but the surroundings pushed him to take off, convinced he would win.

It is simply a large mystery to me how a group of specified intelligent people may not have seen that in 1990 the popular presidential elections in Poland can win only Wales, and especially since there is no chance of defeating him individual as unfit for the presidential run as Mazowieckie. I lived in Krakow at the time, I had a colleague associated with the “Wszystko Tygodnik” environment, and he told me that the full editorial board was convinced that Mazowiecki would win. I wiped my eyes out of amazement, I was convinced that president Wałęsie would be able to take distant an assassination effort on his life. If Mazowiecki had any chances at the time, it was only in the old National Assembly, where almost all MPs of the no-existent PPR would have supported him, fearing the applicable effects of the slogan "acceleration" under which he marched to Belvedere Wales.

The president of Wałęsa tries to grow the powers of the president rather expansionally, accusations of Wałęsa about authoritarian tendencies appeared. You think they were right in years?

I don't think so. I have a very critical attitude towards the presidency of Wales, but not due to the fact that he wants to build an authoritarian system. He did say that he might gotta introduce something like this, but he doesn't want to. And it ended with talking.

The summit of tension between Wałęsa and the SLD-PSL coalition-dominated Seym II word came to the beginning of 1995, at the end of Pawlak's premier mission. At the time, Wałęsa threatened to solve the Sejm under a very far-fetched pretext – impromptu budget. But as his chief legal advisor Prof. Lech Falandysz later spoke, Wałęsa mainly hoped that Falandysz himself would intimidate the Sejm and lead to political solstice. This, of course, was not enough, and the crisis came to an end erstwhile the SLD replaced Pawlak Oleksim.

What about the 1994 draft dinner? The vassal was then accused of trying to revolt the military against the MON and the Sejm's defence committee.

It was the typical rally behaviour of Wałęsa, who did not truly realize how civilian control of the army worked, that certain things could not be done, e.g. inviting generals and asking them if they liked the Minister of Defence, as he had previously asked at the workers' rally, what they thought about the directorship of the plant. So it was more of a problem with the intellectual deficits of Wałęsa than any preparation for the coup.

The experience of co-habitation with Wałęsa did not prompt the Constitutional Committee of the Second Parliament (1993–1997) to consider another model of presidency? Picked by the National Assembly, limited to typical functions?

During the debate on the fresh constitution, everyone agreed that the president must be elected in the general election. From what I remember, only 1 Piotr Ikonowicz proposed a selection by the National Assembly. The work on the constitution by the Sejm dominated by the Wałęsa coalition of the SLD-PSL led under the leadership of the president. At the same time, the essential part of the constitution dedicated to the office of the president takes the final form after the 1995 election, erstwhile Kwasniewski becomes President. And then, from the presidential palace to the SLD, there's a signal: let's not overdo it with the President's power.

If the 1995 presidential election were won by individual else, we could have a constitution with a much weaker president. However, Kwasniewski as President He was blocking specified ideas. There were, for example, discussions or not to radically weaken veto laws. Eventually, it was weakened, present it takes a majority of 3 fifths of the vote, and in a tiny 1992 constitution it took 2 thirds. At the same time, however, the option of removing the veto has not been implemented or allowing it to be broken by a simple majority – which would be the same.

Have you always managed to rise three-fifths to break a veto?

The AWS-dominated Parliament of the III word (1997–2001) managed to reject only 1 of Kwasniewski's 28 wets – on the IPN Act, to which the PSL managed to convince. The PO-PSL coalition then succeeded in overthrowing – with the aid of the SLD – 7 of Lech Kaczyński's 17 wet.

Later, however, vetoes occurred much little often, due to the fact that first Komorowski and later Duda did not want to exposure themselves besides frequently to their own political camps. But erstwhile they vetoed, it was effective. Currently, at this level of conflict between parliament as we have present in Poland, most three-fifths are rather adequate for the president to be able to block the majority of parliament.

So the fact that we have specified solutions, not another solutions concerning the presidency, we owe it to Kwasniewski's lobbying?

The Constitution is the consequence of a compromise of the 4 forces forming it: SLD, PSL, Freedom Union and Labour Union. However, there were no fundamental disputes between them over the organization of the executive authority. The Labour Union was mainly curious in including as wide a catalogue of social rights as possible in the Constitution. The Union of Freedom, on the contrary, to compose down certain liberal solutions, specified as the constitutional debt limit.

The constitutional coalition dispute with the remnant of the right in the Sejm did not concern the form of the presidency either. The alleged social draft constitution prepared at the time by a squad of Solidarity advisers with Jan Olszewski at the head – Krzaklewski very much wanted it to be treated on an equal footing with the Sejm – besides provided for a mixed system. This task differed from the seismic 1 mainly in the world-view dimension: it started with e.g. invocatio dei, otherwise he regulated relations with the Catholic Church etc.

And were there no ideas for the presidential strategy in the Second Parliament? Like coming out of the Wałęsa area?

The presidential strategy had 2 supporters in Poland in the early 1990s. You mentioned one, the another was the Confederation of Polish Independent Leszek Moczulski, who had its draft constitution, referring to the April Constitution. And that concludes the number of serious players curious in the presidential system.

From the left to the right nobody wanted the presidential strategy due to the fact that in it 1 man takes everything. And in the parliamentary cabinet system, especially in the case of coalition governments, the political cake is more divisive. The leader of any environment can get something for himself.

Presidential systems besides have it against each other, that they easy make into authoritarian systems – which is an excellent example of Latin America. The president, who gains all power, tries to extend it by all means, frequently beyond the constitutional limit, or safe the successor's succession. So with all the advantages of the presidential system, it has far more flaws than the Chancellor's system.

Did Kwasniewski's presidency, who was the only 1 to be re-elected in the first circular and even after cutting off its competences in the fresh constitution, manage to play a lot in national and global politics, neglect to establish in Poles the belief that our mixed strategy is not so bad and actually works well?

Kwasniewski surely helped the President's office in Poland, besides thanks to his wife. Therefore, I always say that it was not Kwasniewski who won the election in 2000 already in I round, but the Kwasniewski marriage. After 2005, however, we are definitely dealing with the degradation of the presidency in Poland.

The constitutional compromise from the Second Parliament of the word of office was only possible due to the fact that 36% of the votes that were cast in the 1993 election for the parties to the right were lost due to the fact that the divided right crashed on the electoral threshold. In fact, we received a centre-left Sejm that was able to adopt the constitution. Another chance for a constitutional compromise came in 2005 erstwhile it seemed for a minute that the PO and PiS coalition would rule. But immediately after the parliamentary elections, the parties went into a state of fierce competition over who would take first place in the fresh hand.

Today we have a state of full polarization, Kaczyński and Tusk are incapable to cooperate with each another on any matter, let alone on changes in the constitution, so we will stay with the current strategy for many years. If there is simply a constitutional reset somewhere, it is alternatively around the Constitutional Court and the judiciary – due to the fact that in my opinion it cannot be resolved permanently and effectively without changes to the basic law. It's truly not that if Trzaskowski signs the applicable laws, the problem will be solved. due to the fact that if only PiS returned to power in 2027, he would reverse it, creatively bypassing Trzaskowski's deficiency of consent, e.g. stating by a parliament resolution that his eventual election in 2025 was illegal.

You mentioned the "degradation of the presidency". all next president after Kwasniewski was politically weaker?

Yeah. Lech Kaczyński tried at least to preserve the appearance of independency and subjectivity, but remained in the shadow of his brother all the time and succumbed to him on fundamental issues. Then there was Komorowski, who could no longer defy Tusk on any crucial issue, though he tried in insignificant ones. Duda defied himself in a few, but this yet did not substance much from the point of view of the logic of the PiS governments.

In addition, Duda was openly joking even at the PiS camp. delight note that Jarosław Kaczyński always tried very hard to emphasize that his brother is equal to him. Tusk no longer cared about specified appearances towards Komorowski, but did not show him openly contempt, as Kaczyński did, and behind him another PiS politicians towards Duda. After all, during the first word of the Law and Justice, even the deputy ministers could go to the palace and rise their voice in the presence of the president – the contempt of Kaczyński to Duda was flowing down the organization camera.

It will be very hard for the fresh president to reconstruct respect for office. He'll most likely try. I have said this about Karol Nawrock – he is simply a morbidly ambitious man, the president of the Law and Justice Office does not even realize how much.

But possibly the advantage of this mixed strategy is that it protects us from the morbid ambitions of candidates? In addition, however, Dudy veto did not let the Law on Regional Accounting Chambers or the forced expropriation of TVN.

However, I think the disadvantages outweigh the advantages. due to the fact that truly the situation erstwhile Tusk has been waiting for the president to change for over a year and does small is not optimal for you. But of course, it happens sometimes that the president will block the peculiarly dangerous things that the seismic majority does. However, in my opinion, a better warrant would be to introduce the qualified majority essential for e.g. to vote on laws importantly weakening the autonomy of local government and another matters of this rank. This would affect the introduction of alleged organic laws, i.e. those that cannot be changed by a simple majority.

Unfortunately, that will not happen due to the fact that politicians like the current system. It was very crucial that as shortly as Duda won the presidential election, PiS removed his draft constitution, which had never returned to the network. In early 2017, after the first tensions with Duda, Kaczyński said in 1 of the interviews that his organization erstwhile advocated strengthening the function of President, but present he advocates strengthening the Prime Minister. I liked this message very much, due to the fact that it perfectly shows what constitutional reasoning of Polish political leaders looks like. It is akin with Tusk – the PO has never had its draft constitution, for Tusk it is any detached from the reality of fanaberie.

Only the price of a serious constitutional debate will be that if there is simply a constitutional moment, it will change again, as in 1990, we will compose on our knees yesterday.

Why, despite the limited powers of the President, are presidential elections so emotional and so political?

Presidential elections trigger specified large emotions due to the fact that they are the simplest. Media creates them for a boxing duel, where only 2 players count. In the lost camp, defeat usually causes tectonic movements. There is usually the 3rd 1 who wants to build his formation on a large result. Which mostly succeeds on average – due to the fact that in the last 20 years no 1 has been able to permanently enter the cartel of 4 parties: PiS, PO, PSL and SLD, converted present to fresh Left.

The winner usually pulls his party. Duda's success in 2015 surely opened the way for the PiS to power. Nawrocki's triumph will aid the Law and Justice in subsequent elections, which in the event of his triumph may happen earlier than in 2027.

That is why politicians are so attached to direct presidential elections.

At the same time, key players don't take off.

Because they got burned. Tusk very much survived the defeat with Lech Kaczyński, it was a truly dramatic minute in his political career, he actually believed that he would win then – I will remind you that he won in the first round. Jarosław Kaczyński tried in turn at the most favorable minute for himself, in the spring of 2010, erstwhile he could number on compassion after his brother died – and lost to Bronisław Komorowski.

But besides both leaders know that power is in Poland elsewhere, at the Prime Minister's office. Unless you are a prime minister, like Kaczyński towards Szydło and Morawiecki. It is all the more amazing that even any people curious in politics long believed that Tusk would replace Trzaskowski as a candidate of KO at the last minute.

In presidential elections, it pays to run for the leaders of smaller parties – e.g. Mentzen. If he makes a good result, what is expected, he will importantly strengthen his position in the Confederation and not only.

What is the rate of the current election? The win of Trzaskowski will actually let to organize the state and prepare the coalition ground for triumph in 2027? And Nawrocki's triumph will let the Law and Justice to return to power by 2027?

I'll say this: if Trzaskowski wins, then the PiS will be harder to return to power than if Nawrocki won. And given the rapidly changing global situation, that is the only thing we can say for certain today.

The winds, on the another hand, are blowing in favour of the Law and the Confederacy. These formations can grow stronger due to the fact that Tusk's governments have proved to be disappointing. You can see it in the polls, and erstwhile you talk to people, you can be amazed at how bad it looks. Recently, 2 crucial people in wellness care, who were never Kaczyński's fans, told me independently of each other: during the regulation of the Law and Justice, we did not have as much problem financing hospitals as we do today. possibly Trzaskowski's triumph will let it to someway spin, to push fresh energy into the government, marginalizing TD and left.

But if Nawrocki wins, I think the conflict for control of the army will begin. I spoke critically about Andrzej Duda, but I can commend him for 1 thing: after 13 December he did not go into war with the government for control of the army. And I guess that's where the office starts with Nawrocks. And the government or Kosiniak Kamysz won't be able to do much about it. They can't ban the generals from gathering with a military superior.

A dispute like this could blow up an army. What is peculiarly dangerous in a situation of NATO crisis, erstwhile the conflict on the Europe-State line can completely destabilise the Alliance.

Antoni Dudek – Politologist, historian and publicist, prof. of the University of Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński in Warsaw, creator of the channel The Dudek on History. Author and co-author of respective books, among others: Political past of Poland 1989–2012, PRL without makeup, Twilight dictatorship. Poland from 1985 to 1989 in the light of documents, Institute. individual past of IPN and lately Dudek about history: The Birth of the 3rd Polish Republic.

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