Prior to the presidential election, a concept called the "Roman variant" appeared, and at the time 3 prominent politicians fundamentally spoke in the same voice. Prime Minister Donald Tusk, Marshal of the Sejm Simon Holovnia and Minister of Justice and lawyer General Adam Bodnar, questioned the legality of the home of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs and consequently believed that it would be hard to recognise the results of the elections. The second component of this plan was the taking over of the duties of the president of the Republic of Poland by the Marshal of the Sejm, although the constitution provides for only 2 possibilities, the resignation of the president himself or the declaration of inability to exercise office by the Constitutional Tribunal.
Politicians of the camp of power went, nomen omen, 3rd way and created their own “legal” concept, the key point of which was the failure to receive an oath from the president of the Republic of Poland and to announce a break in the session of the Sejm. At this time, Simon Hołownia, acting as president of the Republic of Poland, was to "kick" all the essential laws, which would liquidate the INKiSP and transfer material property to another home of SN. A completely unrealized and unlawful task was de facto nothing else but an effort to carry out a coup, and this burdened Simon Holovnia to the top extent. Despite this, the head of the Upcoming 3rd Way did not argue and willingly enter this scenario, due to the fact that he most likely had an open chance before his eyes for the full word of the Marshal of the Sejm.
After the election, however, everything changed, Holovnia achieved a terrible score in the first circular and lost not only to Sławomir Mentzen, but besides to Grzegorz Braun. In addition, trauma affected the full governing coalition after two-hour “President” Rafał Trzaskowski. All of this was covered by talks about government reconstruction and abruptly Simon Holovnia completely changed his mind. He first announced very rapidly that he would convene the National Assembly immediately after the adoption of the home of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs, and then did precisely so and signed the resolution. This was a very reasonable and insecure action, due to the fact that what is different is to press the muscles in theoretical coup projects, and what is different is to bear the penalty.
The only thing that can be amazing in all of this is the haste, which, however, after time was explained. writer Marcin Fijolek in the Podcast of the Interia "Politic WF" stated that he had obtained the following information from a reliable source:
Simon Holovnia, and I know that, from a good source, let's call it that, he received a very clear proposal from Donald Tusk, not to even say an offer or suggestions to postpone the swearing-in of Karol Nawrocki, or to actually post the script that prof. Andrzej Zoll presented. I mean, there's the National Assembly, Simon Holovnia opens it, but after 2 minutes he says, “I'm going to make a break for the saint never, or for 2 weeks, due to the fact that we gotta number the votes.” Simon Holovnia refused. And that, too, I think is the origin of additional tension on the Tusk line.
Although it is always crucial to keep a distance from anonymous interviews and information, this account bears all the credibility. First of all, this is Donald Tusk's favourite model of politics – to reprove and shift responsibility. Secondly, specified a scandal would completely distract from the coalition crisis, the failure of Rafał Trzaskowski and all others 100 specifics in 100 days. Why did the Romanian option yet not occur? The reasons are much from interior force through external pressures to fear that there might have been a riot, but the decisive thing was the attitude of the smaller coalitions and Simon Holownia himself, who did not want to spend the remainder of his life in prison.
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