Chapter I

Introduction and socio-historical context

1.1. Historical context of Polish-Ukrainian relations
Polish-Ukrainian relations have for centuries been complicated, full of both cooperation and painful conflicts. 1 of the most dramatic events remains the genocide in Volyn and east Galicia (1943–1944), erstwhile formations of Ukrainian nationalists (UN-UPA) carried out mass murders on the Polish civilian population. Memory of these events for long decades has burdened common relations, becoming 1 of the main barriers to full reconciliation.

1.2. Political and social change since 2021
The beginning of 2021 in Poland and Ukraine was due to expanding geopolitical uncertainty. The increasing tensions between Russia and the West, followed by the full-scale aggression of Russia to Ukraine on February 24, 2022, completely transformed the dynamics of relations.
In the face of the war, Poland accepted millions of refugees from Ukraine, organizing the largest humanitarian operation in its history. Polish society has shown large solidarity – both organization and grassroots.

1.3. expanding the importance of public opinion surveys
Since 2021, we have noted the intensification of sociological research, analysing changing social sentiments concerning:

• reception of refugees from Ukraine,
• relations with the Ukrainian community surviving in Poland,
• the perception of Ukraine as a state,
• expectations of historical accounts, including the Volyn massacre.

These studies included:
– CBOS (Social Opinion investigation Centre),
– IBRiS (Institute for marketplace and Social Research),
– IPSOS Poland,
– PISM (Polish Institute of global Affairs),
– Polish Academy of Sciences under peculiar projects,
– and independent investigation centres and universities (e.g. Warsaw University, UMCS).

1.4. Main investigation questions of the article
In this survey we will answer any key questions:

• How has the attitude of Poles to Ukraine and Ukrainians changed since 2021?
• What were the factors that led to an increase in sympathy or an increase in distance?
• Have there been clear differences in the assessment of Ukrainians surviving in Poland and war refugees?
• How did the subject of Volyn function in the public debate between 2021 and 2020?
• Has there been a crucial change in the expectations of Poles towards Ukrainian authorities regarding the historical settlement of genocide?

1.5. The importance of the subject in the position of Polish abroad and interior policy
Changes in the social reception of Ukraine affect not only Polish-Ukrainian regular relations, but besides political decisions:
– political and military support for Ukraine,
– shaping historical narrative,
– an approach to joint cultural and educational initiatives.

Chapter II

Dynamics of changes in public opinion in Poland towards Ukraine and Ukrainians from 2021 to 2020

2.1. Poland before the war – a moderately affirmative but distant ratio
At the beginning of 2021, the attitude of Poles to Ukraine and Ukrainians could be described as diverse – with the advantage of cautious optimism, but besides with a certain cultural and historical distance.

According to CBOS data (October 2021 study),:

• 36% of Poles declared sympathy towards Ukrainians,
• 25% declared antipathy,
• The remainder (approximately 39%) remained neutral.
  Greater trust and affirmative emotions were noted among younger people and the inhabitants of large cities.

In the context of historical events specified as the Volyn massacre, social expectations towards Ukraine were moderate: around 40% of respondents believed that the Ukrainian authorities should express a clear apology, but at the same time many Poles pointed out that “the future of relations is more crucial than the past.”

2.2. The outbreak of war – a wave of empathy and social mobilization
Russia's aggression to Ukraine on 24 February 2022 caused a violent change in social sentiments.
Poland has become 1 of the main host countries for war refugees. According to a CBOS survey of March 2022:

• 89% of Poles supported the reception of refugees from Ukraine,
• 83% felt that Poland should support Ukraine politically and militarily,
• 77% declared wanting individual assistance (financial, material, organizational).

It was unprecedented social mobilization, both bottom-up (volunteer, collection, admission of refugees to homes) and organization (state support, local governments, NGOs).

2.3. Ukrainians surviving in Poland – changing perception
In earlier years Ukrainians were seen mainly as employed workers (service sector, construction, agriculture).
As a consequence of the war, the migration structure changed:

• Most recently arrived refugees are women, children and elderly,
• Ukrainians began to be seen as victims of war, not just migrant workers.

According to an IBRiS survey for “Rzeczpospolita” (April 2022):

• 74% of Poles declared affirmative attitude towards Ukrainians surviving in Poland,
• Only 8% were negative.

2.4. Emotional Transformation in Media and Public Culture
The media and political communicative has changed significantly:

• Ukraine was portrayed as a hero of the conflict for the freedom of all Europe,
• Ukrainians were referred to as brothers, allies, partners,
• There were initiatives of symbolic closeness, specified as the reception of Ukrainian flags on public buildings, solidarity concerts, as well as common prayers in churches.

Example:
In his speech at the Royal Castle in Warsaw in March 2022, U.S. president Joe Biden spoke about “the large courage of Polish society”, stressing Poland's function in solidarity with Ukraine.

2.5. Have the historical themes gone further?
In 2022, the issue of the settlement of the Volyn massacre was clearly shifted to the margins of the public debate.
CBOS investigation indicated that for most Poles at the time ad hoc aid and triumph of Ukraine in the war were much more crucial than remembering historical harm.

• 61% of respondents considered that "historical settlements can be postponed",
• only 24% demanded "immediate gestures" from the Ukrainian authorities.

2.6. Conclusions from 2021 to 1922
The change in Polish society was 1 of the most dynamic transformations in the perception of neighbours in the past of the III Polish Republic:

• from a skeptical, average distance to enthusiastic support and commitment,
• from focusing on the past to concentrating on the common future.

However, as we will see in the following chapters, this solidarity began to be tested between 2023 and 2024 with the emergence of the first tensions relating to migration, the economical situation and issues of historical memory.

Chapter III

Stability and first signs of tension in Polish-Ukrainian relations (2023-2024)

3.1. Exhaustion of first Enthusiasm
As the war continued in Ukraine and the deteriorating economical situation in Europe, including Poland, the first symptoms of public fatigue began to appear.
The March 2023 CBOS survey indicated that:

• 61% of Poles continued to support Ukraine,
• However, the number of people opposed to further aid increased from 8% (in 2022) to 19%.

There was besides a feeling that “help should have its limits”, especially in the context of its own economical problems (inflation, expensiveness, energy crisis).

3.2. Changing perceptions of Ukrainian refugees
While in the first year of war Ukrainians were seen mainly as war victims requiring support, in 2023 there were more complex emotions:

• 47% of respondents believed that Ukrainians “integrated well”,
• but 31% claimed that “they are privileged to access benefits” (IBRiS survey for “Rzeczpospolita”, June 2023).

Many respondents began to see tensions in the labour market, in the healthcare strategy and in education.
Importantly, negative feelings were not always directed towards the Ukrainians themselves, but more frequently towards the actions of Polish institutions, which, according to many Poles, did not cope with fresh challenges.

3.3. The grain crisis and its impact on the mood
A peculiar minute of tension was the alleged "cereal affair" in the second half of 2023.
Polish farmers protested the uncontrolled influx of cheaper Ukrainian grain into the Polish market, which led to a fall in home product prices and problems for many farms.
The dispute led to:

• temporary cooling of political relations,
• increasing the number of statements critical of Ukraine in the public debate,
• growing belief that Poland must defend its own economical interests more.

According to an October 2023 Ipsos study:

• 52% of Poles felt that Poland's economical interests should be prioritised even at the expense of tensions with Ukraine,
• Only 38% advocated maintaining unchanged support even at the expense of economical losses.

3.4. The Return of Historical Issues – Volyn massacre again
The year 2023 besides brought about a renewed debate on Volyn. In July, in connection with the 80th anniversary of the Volyn massacre, this subject again became the subject of public and political discussion.

Important events:

• The Ukrainian and Polish authorities organised joint commemorative events,
• During his visit to Warsaw, Volodymyr Zelenski expressed his symbolic condolences, but did not usage the word “sorry”, which was met with mixed reactions.

According to a CBOS poll (August 2023):

• 48% of Poles considered Zelenski's gestures insufficient,
• 41% were satisfied with this way of commemoration.

Thus, the subject of Volyn remains emotionally alive, although more and more people admit that the future of Polish-Ukrainian relations is more crucial than the perfect settlement of the past.

3.5. Regional and generational diversity of moods
It is worth noting that the attitude towards Ukraine and the Ukrainians was not uniform throughout society:

• The inhabitants of large cities showed greater tolerance and support,
• The inhabitants of the smaller towns and east regions of Poland showed more frequent anxiety and fatigue of migration.

Generational division was besides significant:

• people under the age of 30 were much more open to Ukrainians,
• people over the age of 60 have referred much more to the memory of Volyn and historical events.

3.6. Conclusions 2023–2024
Polish aid to Ukraine and Ukraine from 2021 to 2020 was a model of solidarity, but from 2023 to 2024 a more realistic, interesting optics began to appear.
Society began to separate between humanitarian support and the protection of its own interests, and historical issues, although moved to the background, were not completely forgotten.

Chapter IV

Modern challenges and the future of Polish-Ukrainian relations in the social opinion (2025)

4.1. Endurance of solidarity or fatigue of war?
In 2025 Poland remains 1 of the most crucial partners of Ukraine in Europe. However, data from fresh public opinion polls indicate that social attitudes towards Ukrainians and the Ukrainian issue have changed further.
According to a February 2025 CBOS report:

• 54% of Poles proceed to support Ukraine,
• 29% believe that aid should be limited,
• 17% believe that Poland should end military support and focus on its own affairs.

So there is simply a stabilization trend: support for Ukraine is inactive dominant, but not on the scale of mass mobilisation from 2022.

4.2. The perception of Ukrainians surviving in Poland was constantly changed
The social perception of Ukrainians surviving in Poland since 2022 has undergone crucial evolution.
Studies conducted by PISM (January 2025) show:

• 68% of Poles consider Ukrainians surviving in Poland to be “full members of local communities”,
• 18% feel that “Ukrainians receive besides much support at the expense of Polish citizens”,
• 14% declare reluctance or reserve towards Ukrainian immigrants.

An crucial origin of this change was the increase in Ukrainian activity in social life: setting up companies, participating in local elections (where possible), active in social organizations.

4.3. Memory of Volyn – a lasting component of the relationship
The issue of Volyn massacre remains an important, though not a dominant part of Polish-Ukrainian social relations.
In 2025:

• 55% of Poles feel that Ukraine should full recognise and apologize for the Volyn crimes,
• 35% say that cooperation and the future are the most important, even without a full apology,
• Only 10% believe that Volyn's subject is of small importance today.

This emphasizes the sustainability of collective memory in Poland, especially in east and south-eastern regions, where the descendants of the Econovians constitute a large part of the community.

4.4. Challenges: integration, historical policy, security
Polish-Ukrainian relations at social level face respective key challenges in 2025:

• Integration of refugees: long-term integration programmes are needed, including education, the labour marketplace and the wellness system.
• Historical narrative: politicians on both sides must balance historical fact with the request to build partnerships.
• Security: Poland remains committed to building a regional defence strategy in Central and east Europe, in which Ukraine plays a key role.

4.5. Forecasts: relations in the position of society
Studies of sociologists, including Prof. Pawel Długosz (ICM, 2025), show that:

• Polish-Ukrainian solidarity is not a transitional phenomenon – it is established as a fresh foundation of Polish abroad policy,
• At the same time, the increase in social realism makes society look forward to a more symmetrical relation – reciprocity in assistance, respect, fair accounting of history,
• The memory of Volyn will proceed to be present, but it will not block the strategical alliance.

4.6. Summary
Poland inactive supports Ukraine in 2025, but social sentiments are more nuanced:

• less romantic,
• more pragmatic,
• based on national interest and long-term cooperation, while maintaining sensitivity to historical memory.

Chapter V

Analysis of public opinion surveys – detailed data and trends 2021-2025

5.1. The attitude of Poles to Ukraine – a general trend

Analysis of available investigation (CBOS, IPSOS, IBRiS, PISM) from 2021 to 2020 allows to separate 3 main stages of changes in the perception of Ukraine by Poles:

Conclusion:
In the long word we see a affirmative but realistic attitude towards Ukraine.

5.2. Acceptance of Ukrainians surviving in Poland

CBOS and IBRiS surveys noted the systematic change in the reception of the Ukrainian minority:

• 2021: 42% positive, 25% negative, 33% neutral,
• 2022: 74% positive, 8% negative (recorded indicators),
• 2023: 65% positive, 15% negative,
• 2024: 61% positive, 19% negative,
• 2025: 68% positive, 14% negative.

Conclusion:
Despite any tiredness, most Poles keep a affirmative attitude towards Ukrainians – this process is much more unchangeable than frequently assumed in the public debate.

5.3. Volyn issue in public awareness

The Volyn massacre awareness survey (CBOS, PISM) indicates the sustainability of a advanced level of cognition of the subject:

Conclusion:
Knowledge of the subject remains high, but its impact on current social attitudes diminishes.

5.4. relation to reception of refugees – a change in dynamics

From 2022 to 2025, there was a marked change:

Conclusion:
Although the level of support is gradually decreasing, most Poles inactive accept the presence of Ukrainian refugees.

5.5. Main factors affecting social attitudes

Analysis indicates that the following variables are crucial for the improvement of attitudes:

• The economical situation (inflation, energy crisis) is affecting protectionist sentiments,
• Local experience (e.g. contact with refugees in schools, on the labour market) – shapes individual opinions,
• Historical events and collective memory (Volyńska slaughter) – play a symbolic role, but decreasing in everyday relationships,
• Political narration and media – bordering war and aid Ukraine has a direct effect on social sentiment.

5.6. Generation and geographical comparison

Regionally:

• The biggest support: Mazowieckie, Lower Silesian, Pomeranian,
• The largest reserves: Podkarpackie, Lublin, Świętokrzyskie.

Conclusion:
The younger generations and residents of large cities are much more open to Ukrainians and cooperation with Ukraine.

Chapter VI

Historical policy, memory of Volyn and the future of Polish-Ukrainian relations: a possible script of increasing aversion

6.1. Context of the end of unconditional support
Since 2021 Poland has shown unprecedented solidarity with Ukraine, and aid to refugees has become a part of national pride. However, the years 2023-2025 have brought qualitative changes:

• Increase in social fatigue
• The deteriorating economical situation,
• First signs of conflicts of interest (agriculture, labour market, housing),
• Failed expectations of clear gestures of historical settlement by Ukraine.

All of this together creates favorable conditions for expanding dislike of Ukraine among parts of society.

6.2. The function of historical memory and unfulfilled expectations
One of the key problems that can deepen the future reluctance of Poles is the issue of Volyn.
In 2025, despite any symbolic gestures, Ukraine:

• She didn't make an authoritative act of full apology,
• She did not explicitly admit the nature of the Volyn crime as genocide,
• He inactive promotes historical heroes who are liable for crimes for Poles (including Stepan Bandera, Roman Szuchewycz).

Research shows that the memory of Volyn is peculiarly vivid among older generations and the inhabitants of east regions of Poland. The deficiency of a satisfactory solution to this issue for Poles over time can lead to a build-up of resentiment.

6.3. economical tensions and the effect of "resource competition"
Another crucial origin is the increased economical feeling of competition:

• Ukrainian refugees utilizing the Polish education, wellness and benefits system,
• Ukrainian workers competing in the labour market, frequently accepting lower wages,
• Inflow of cheaper goods from Ukraine destabilising local markets (e.g. grain crisis 2023).

Such economical conflicts form the basis for political narratives in which Ukrainians are presented as a threat to the social and economical stableness of Poland.

6.4. temper change – forecast 2026–2030
On the basis of current trends, a realistic forecast of the improvement of social sentiments can be presented:

If these trends are not decently managed by the political and social elites of both countries, Poles may become increasingly reluctant to Ukraine.
Social sentiments in Poland can shift from solidarity to average and even open aversion in certain environments.

6.5. Recommendations for the future

To avoid specified a scenario, action is needed:

• From the Ukrainian authorities: courageous historical gestures, clear designation of the fact about Volyn, work to destruct cultural barriers,
• On the part of Polish political elites: consistent, honest integration policy and a decision distant from privileged immigrants, social education with real benefits of cooperation.

6.6. Summary

Polish-Ukrainian social relations in 2025 stand at a crossroads. The choice of the way – whether it will be a further partnership or increasing tensions and common distrust – depends not only on state policy, but besides on the actions of local communities and organisations.
The future is not determined – but the script of increasing reluctance becomes a real threat if there is no wise management of social and historical relations.