Blacksmith: “Help” in abroad policy misdirects politicians. Political communication is interests and common obligations

Michał Sutowski: Who will find Polish abroad policy now? For the last 8 years it has not been the Ministry of abroad Affairs or the Prime Minister, the distribution center was in Nowogrodzka. Where's he going now?

Paweł Kowal: There is simply a government from abroad policy, and it will be led by the Minister of abroad Affairs, together with the Prime Minister, which was explicitly stated in the exposé. Minister Adam Szpiek will play an apparent function in European affairs.

The government centre, besides through personalization, can be consistent and share work functionally, approx. But there's the president. erstwhile that he has constitutional powers, and 2 that the bill a fewer weeks ago gave him additional powers. And 3 – respective Polish governments already had a tradition of “wars over a chair”...

After all, the presidential law in question is unconstitutional. The president should work with the government under co-habitation. On the another hand, it can execute the functions defined in the Constitution, related to representation, individual persuasion on the global phase for the sake of the Polish state. Sometimes this is helpful and helpful.

Like when?

For example, in relations with any east countries, where power systems are powerfully presidential. Then the President's individual support helps a lot – I'm not even talking about Ukraine, where the situation is more complicated, but there are specified crucial countries for us in Central Asia, specified as Kazakhstan, where the presidential level always plays a large role. But this always happens on the basis of government policy, according to which the president presents a state position, which, however, is formulated by the government.

I realize what the Constitution says, but conflicts over chair – that is, about who is to represent Poland in the European Union – have already occurred in conditions much little acute than today.

There is no conflict over the chair, the Prime Minister flew to the European Council and sat in the right chair. She was there as the right typical of Poland.

The government and the president are 2 players, and there is simply a parliament and its Committee on abroad Affairs, which you are chairing. Again, she hasn't seemed peculiarly needed in the last 8 years...

The Commission is to establish a parliamentary platform for a strong, social justification for government abroad policy. We will talk about it outside on the global stage, and now there is simply a large interest in changes in Poland.

Talk, don't drive?

Foreign policy runs the government, period. The Minister of abroad Affairs is key. However, as a parliamentarian and its chief, I intend to make the Committee on abroad Affairs – as in many mature democracies – treated as a peculiar parliamentary body, which specifically engages in supporting, justifying the government's actions. The aim is to besides benefit from the support of parliamentary politicians who are usually against government policy, but are ready to make an exception on matters of safety and abroad policy. The Commission is simply a good place for specified activities.

But is this "supporting, justifying government action" that means that the members of the committee will repeat outside that the government is right?

No, it means that we have a imagination of social abroad policy, and so 1 in which the Ministry of abroad Affairs itself, the Prime Minister and the full government are fulfilling their duties. In the modern world, however, global relations are besides something more: think-tanks, social organizations, churches, relief organizations, honorary consuls... There is inactive a full sphere of paradymulation – that is, global cooperation implemented by local governments. This can all strengthen the effectiveness of our conventional abroad policy. And many of these roles naturally fit the mission of parliament.

In addition, it is besides the function of Members representing the majority to explain the government's policy, to talk about it in a understandable way to the public. That is why I myself powerfully engage in social media – so that people can see that meetings with diplomats, leaders of opinion, social organizations, are not coffee and tiny talk, but an additional instrument of action.

What can a associate do that the government can't?

This, in turn, is simply a substance of parliamentary diplomacy. The point is, among another things, that there may be contacts through Parliament that would be awkward at government level for various reasons – Taiwan is simply a good example. In addition, here too, on the place we must scope the environments that deal with abroad policy in Poland. And this is simply a very absorbing, peculiar task for which, by nature, the minister or prime minister does not have much time.

That is why we will do this – for example, we will invitation think-tanks to the gathering of the Committee on abroad Affairs, so that people with large cognition and good contacts in the planet know what is happening in matters of global policy in the Sejm and have contact with the Polish government themselves. There's never been a forum like this before.

And it's not going to be the same gentlemen as before 2015 again?

No, due to the fact that besides an crucial component I care about is the affirmative consequence to the request for greater participation of women in abroad policy, which is simply a trend called a feminist abroad policy.

I know that in the past of the 3rd Polish women played a large function in diplomacy – I will mention only the ambassador to Vatican Hanna Suchocka, the ambassador to Spain and the Czech Republic Grażyna Bernatowicz and Barbara Tuge-Erecińska, who led the facilities in Sweden, Denmark, large Britain or Cyprus. I've learned a lot from them. But I besides know that more needs to be done present – that is why the committee will start dialog with social organisations, we will examine the experiences of Sweden and Germany and another countries. I'm open to it.

What precisely do we want in abroad policy? In his exposé, the Prime Minister listed lobbying as the first goal to sustain and strengthen Western military, political and economical assistance to Ukraine.

This is due to the main communicative of Prime Minister Donald Tusk, which was security. due to the fact that safety is the main social emotion today, and its problem is the main political issue. Both short-term, tactically, and therefore, it is simply a question of the Ukrainians being able to decision on the front, which unfortunately has virtually failed this year. But besides in the average term, where we peculiarly want to defend the borders of the Union in the east. And in the long term, the strategical point is, of course, to re-establish the state after the period of authoritarian written rule, in conditions where the main challenge is security.

One thing at a time. What can we do about safety in the short word in the West erstwhile president Zelenski himself is incapable to break the interior political dispute in the US? After all, Ukraine and 60 billion aids to it became hostages of the Republicans' dispute with the Democrats, or, in fact, Trump with the Democrats over a wall on the border with Mexico.

We should get active in this dispute and convince ourselves that this is not a question of "help of Ukraine", but of the safety of all Central and Western Europe.

But what does the Republicans care about the safety of Central Europe? They care about the wall and Trump's victory.

The argument is simple: these expenses do not affect the Mexico border.

This is no argument, due to the fact that for them spending on reinforcement of Ukraine is an argumentative lever, not a origin of the problem.

The more individual tells you something's impossible, the more in politics you gotta insist on it. The safety arguments lie on the table and are obvious. Republicans have no real problem with their voters erstwhile it comes to Ukraine – at most they can make it. Our function is to tell them not to go that way due to the fact that it doesn't make sense. Besides, these Republicans I'm talking to, they usually already know it.

Is it not that, since Ukraine's success at the front so much depends on US help, in Europe lobbying for it is rather secondary to what will be achieved in Washington?

Once again: there is no specified thing as "help for Ukraine", it is actually about helping yourself. If 1 does not connect in one's head the "case of Ukraine" with the safety of his own household in 2 or 5 years, it will not work. Our challenge is to work on political heads in Europe so that these 2 cables connect. If you are talking about any abstract “help of Ukraine”, then the completely acceptable consequence of Danish or Dutch policy will sound...

"Why not aid Gaza"?

Like what? There are quite a few terrible conflicts in the world, aren't there?

I realize that this is not just about them, it is about us, our security, the countries of the European Union. But what arguments does the fresh government have in this respect that the Law and Justice Government did not or did not want to apply? What brings us to the Western partners in this matter? How will this government make a difference?

He doesn't gotta do it, she already is. due to the fact that this government stabilizes the West, and that government destabilizes.

And that's enough? The same arguments made by a more credible actor make a difference?

This seems to be the case with the money from the KPO – a credible political promise and a shown plan to solve the problem solve the matter.

In the case of the KPO there is simply a different logic – that government wanted to submit to the judiciary, not and I presume it will effort to fix the situation. But why should our position in the issue of safety in the east be radically strengthened now? due to the fact that we're more credible about the regulation of law?

It works so that you gotta have credibility in the west to aid yourself in the east – what's controversial about that?

The fact that the interests of the safety of the Dutch, and even more of the Italians and Spaniards in the east, request not overlap with ours. They presume Putin's what he is, he's crazy, but he's not going to drop bombs on Berlin or Amsterdam.

Their own think tank already clearly says that Putin cannot be given time to arm or regroup. What do you gotta do, damn it, to get it to the closed heads? It's adequate for them to understand. Again, much depends on the language – there is besides much of this "help" in the narrative, and this misdirects the attention of politicians.

What if the U.S. legislature doesn't agree on helping Ukraine?

He will, besides due to the fact that military aid to Ukraine is in a package with assistance to Israel. The problem is what happens next. We request to consider how much more we can get from legislature before the American presidential run actually begins. In any case, what is happening now determines the possibilities on the front of the defence against Russia in 2024. In all variant it will be another year on the old rules, even if the worst script was fulfilled and Trump won and decided to change US policy towards Russia.

Is it that Ukrainians have a list of expectations about circumstantial types of support and weapons – and we should just push for them to get them, or do we have our extra agenda here?

We have – it is about what can be produced in Poland. We should have our own industrial agenda in this context and effort to guarantee that part of arms and ammunition for Ukraine is created here. This is 1 of the elements of the change of approach, due to the fact that it is apparent that for the Law and Justice they were incapable to link it. The SS did not realize 1 basic fact that almost all component of support for Ukraine can have affirmative effects on Polish business. That these elements can build jobs in Poland.

But it is most likely not only the PiS' position that the economical interests of Polish and Ukrainian in various matters are divergent.

No, it's from the way you think.

Cereals?

Here you go: the allegedly nonsubjective "controversy of interests" consisted in the fact that Ukrainian cereals for export, which was to be transported through Poland, were sold cheaply to the company's friends with the camp of power. possibly individual got caught by accident on the way, but in principle, 1 had to have access and cognition of this "possibilities" and so participate in the process. In another words...

This was not “the marketplace failure?

No, it was an oligarchic arrangement. It is always in times of war that any people want to fall into someone's misery, and it is always the function of the state to hinder their way. It is no coincidence that Robert Telus as Minister of Agriculture in the government of Mateusz Morawiecki never revealed the list of companies that benefited from it – although he promised. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian grain had to be transported safely to the Baltic and made money on the transit alternatively than blocking the border. It should have been shown that Poland has the ability to reorganise transit and make money quickly.

And this was a series situation: stupidity or sabotage?

From the cycle: a desire to earn. In their immediate surroundings, which had already become highly liberalized, an chance for profit appeared, and the state interest was no longer relevant.

Cereals are not the only conflicting subject – Polish carriers talk about unfair competition.

Except not from Ukraine. At the time of the abolition of licences for Ukrainian carriers, the PiS-ers issued 3 times more licences than usually for all others – for example, Belarusians or Russians, who gotta have a licence to work in Poland – after which... announced that there was a crisis on the transport market. This means that the origin of the crisis was mainly PiS-owska policy, which reminded the visa policy very much: the more they shouted that the Polish marketplace had to be protected, the more absurdly they issued licences, importantly above what was in the yearly standard.

So there was no nonsubjective conflict of interest in which cheaper carriers from Ukraine displace Polish?

There was a problem to solve in a simple way: no additional licenses were to be issued and the transport in Poland was to be carefully checked to see if cabotage was occurring, namely the actual takeover of the marketplace within the European Union. From the results of road inspections to date, this phenomenon has been estimated to be around 1 percent of transport. But the question arises as to why, in fact, the government of the Law and Justice has limited controls. After all, it was the Polish government that was expected to take care of the interests of especially smaller transport companies – but they ignored them and then pretended to be innocent. There was a reason at the Polish border that carriers represented 8 1000 trucks, and in Poland there were a full of 400 1000 of them.

To block the border with Ukraine was enough.

It was adequate due to the PiS' approach to east politics, which was already in the final phase based only on the desire for fast profit or the incitement of anti-Ukrainian sentiments, but not the interests of the country.

How would you specify these?

To go to the European Union with the initiative of additional measures to improve the quality of transport corridors, build warehouses and gain money. Otherwise, others will fill this vacuum. After all, if obstructed as a channel of wheat export is the Black Sea, it is logical that the cereals will go through the Baltic Sea.

Let's say 1 more border, then. due to the fact that I am very curious what Prime Minister Tusk meant erstwhile he said that the boundaries were to be sealed, but that it could be done in a human way. What precisely does that mean?

I have explained this to everyone since the beginning of the border crisis: there is no government that wants to keep power and does not defender the border. Effectiveness in its protection, especially if it is simply a frontier of the European Union, is completely fundamental to the existence of the government and to the functioning of the state. Inefficiency in this substance will weaken the position of Polish authorities.

"Ineffectiveness" means that people should not cross the border and yet pass through. But there is another problem, which is that on this border, whether people die close this border, besides straight as a consequence of the actions of the Border Guard.

They shouldn't die there. I mean adequate not to do pushbacks, but besides to effectively defender the border. This is no devilish dilemma from which “it is impossible to come out.” Depending on the terrain and weather conditions, utilizing an electronic barrier and a consequence system, or a physical barrier.

And the barrier is expected to be effective adequate for no 1 to cross it.

Yes, the point of protecting the border is that no 1 crosses it illegally.

What if he does? Is that back behind the fence?

No, then the situation needs to be handled formally, according to the law and to see what circumstantial individual has position and to decide what next. Of course, border guards must behave on the basis of strict procedures, including possible additional procedures in peculiar situations – how to deal with a pregnant woman, as with a child, as with an adult man, and as with a direct threat to life, including the life of a guard. But there is no way that we should halt protecting the border or turn a blind eye to the effectiveness of security. This is always the reason for the emergence of extremist sentiment in society and populist victories. The mechanics is simple: who relativises the issue of border protection leads to a triumph in his country of populists, fascists and others, and who withdraws his country with tiny steps from the Schengen area.

What's the function of Frontex?

More than always – 1 of the conclusions after the crises of fresh years is that Frontex should be strengthened, not officials, but border officers. Just as the covid crisis should consequence in strengthening a common European wellness policy, so should the border crises consequence in the expansion of Frontex and its greater powers as regards coordination between EU countries. Moreover, the greater rights of Frontex to defend the border on its own initiative – since it is simply a common Union border.

In a fresh conversation with “Rzeczpospolita” you spoke about the overall renewal of relations with Ukraine. What precisely is that expected to mean?

First of all, they should be based on a completely fresh legal document, preferably a fresh treaty. due to the fact that Poland's relations with Ukraine cannot be conducted as the PiS wanted, and thus based on immediate findings and emotions. The same people throughout the year called for the creation of a common Polish-Ukrainian state, and then proposed a trade blockade of fighting Ukraine in April 2023. Our approach is different. abroad policy is not a name for your aunt, there is nothing to be offended or driven by emotions. global relations must be realistic: they must be based on the obligations of the parties.

But why the fresh treaty? And what would it contain?

In Polish-Ukrainian relations so much has changed that it is necessary. We have been writing about this for a long time with erstwhile Prime Minister John Krzysztof Bielecki. This thought is besides close to Minister Sikorski. Moreover, even president Duda declared that he was going to go in this direction. So, yes – we request a treaty to measurement this German-French one.

But what's inside?

It must be assumed that Ukraine will enter the EU and NATO and in this spirit make an open paper for the future. Its elements should include the establishment of common political institutions, specified as joint meetings of parliament and government from time to time, as well as joint technological institutions – like a common university. Further, real synergies in military and economical cooperation should be an crucial component of the fresh treaty. Cooperation in agriculture, processing and transport should besides be part of specified a fresh regulation. After all, we are faced with a life chance of a large change, which can open large prospects for creating fresh jobs by Poland and our business. My approach to Polish-Ukrainian relations is simple. These are very close relationships, there will be good and bad elements in them, these we must overcome. But after that misfortune Putin prepared, we request to open a fresh chapter and play with past much more than the issues that are to be resolved today.

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Paweł Kowal – Prof. ISP PAN, associate of the Civic Coalition Club, president of the Parliamentary Committee on abroad Affairs. From 2006 to 2007, Deputy Minister of abroad Affairs in the government of Jarosław Kaczyński, author of books, among others. The end of the power system. General Wojciech Jaruzelski's squad policy from 1986 to 1989 (2012), Prometheus' will. Sources of the east 3rd Republic policy (2018), and late – together with Agnieszka Lichnerowicz – It won't be easy anymore. The end of our belle époque (2023).