The national Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, BfV) – a German civilian counterintelligence service – published an yearly threat report. Russia ranks again as the outside enemy. What about the situation inside?
“The utmost Right” – a description or a real threat?
In the Verfassungsschutzbericht study 2024, the German services one more time include the ‘outright right’ as the main threats to national interior security. The number of people classified as related to this environment increased to 40,660 – 23% more than a year ago. As many as 15,300 of them were considered violent. but that the concept of "right-wing extremism" is utilized by BfV highly widely – and frequently has the character of a more political stigmatisation than a reliable classification.
It must be made clear that the German services under the slogan "the utmost right" realize not only neo-Nazi organizations, but besides legal parties – like alternate für Deutschland (AfD). In 2025, for the first time the full organization was covered by full supervision of the services as a “confirmed case of extremism”. This decision is controversial in Germany. AfD is an ideologically diverse group: alongside the national-conservative wing, which operates mainly in the western lands, there are fact factions of a much more extremist character, especially in east Germany, in the erstwhile GDR. In Thuringia or Saxony 1 can talk about influences of neo-Nazi pedigree environments – it is there where the study locates structures that relativize national socialism, let language of hatred towards migrants and competition constitutional order.
However, AfD at national level is not uniform. Its pragmatic wing — represented by any of the Bundestag Members or MEPs — declares its commitment to democracy, opposition to anti-Semitism and compliance with the law. However, BfV decided to take over the full organization on a permanent basis, arguing, among others, the tolerance of utmost statements, the presence of erstwhile members of neo-Nazi organizations and the insufficient consequence to racist incidents within regional structures. Critics of this decision point out that the services are increasingly utilizing the word "extremism" as regards legal opposition, which could lead to stigmatisation of millions of voters and to undermining the principles of democratic pluralism.
In the same chapter, the study pays peculiar attention to the Reichsbürger movement, which brings together those who deny the existence of the national Republic of Germany as a legal state being. Participants in this environment reject jurisdiction of courts, do not recognise government, consider themselves citizens of the Reich. In 2024, members of the movement were active in organizing illegal militias, planning bombings and collecting firearms. BfV treats Reichsbürger as an expanding threat, especially in the context of their attempts to infiltrate local administration and uniformed services. Their number is estimated to be respective 1000 active members, of which a large part was considered ready for violence.
The most common crimes attributed to right-wing extremists in 2024 were: 1089 cases of physical violence, including 953 injuries and 124 attacks on state institutions or their representatives. In addition, 214 cultural or spiritual hatred crimes have been reported, 315 cases of public usage of banned symbols (such as swastikas or another references to the 3rd Reich) and more than 2,000 propaganda incidents — from flyers and banners to online hatred speech. 81 acts of vandalism directed at mosques and 43 against synagogues were besides reported, which BfV is straight linked to ideological radicalisation of right-wing environments.
However, there is an expanding criticism of the automatic designation of full ideological groups as a threat. Opponents of this communicative point out that social radicalisation is frequently due to real problems: the sense of marginalisation, the deficiency of representation in public debate, the deficiency of control over migration or the energy crisis. In this perspective, part of the AfD electorate does not preach utmost views, but seeks an alternate to the concrete establishment. Stigmatizing the full formation can lead not to weakening extremism, but to further polarisation and strengthening anti-systemic moods.
In summary, the BfV study on alleged right-wing extremism shows a complex picture. On the 1 hand, we are facing a real threat from neo-Nazi structures and anti-system movements like Reichsbürger. On the another hand, with the dangerous extension of the concept of "extremism" to opposition forces, which could lead to the delegitimisation of legal opposition and violations of the principles of pluralist democracy. The boundary between radicalism and civilian opposition is becoming increasingly hard to grasp.
Left-wing extremism – underrated threat on the another side of the barricade
Unlike the "high right", the German national safety Service see left-wing extremism as a smaller but inactive crucial threat. In BfV's assessment, the number of people active in extremist leftist structures amounted to 10 700 in 2024, of which about 850 are considered possibly prone to violence. Although this is much little than in the case of the right, left-wing extremism is more hard to foretell and frequently benefits from higher social acceptance – especially in academic, media or activist circles.
The study stresses that ideological sources of extremist activities are anti-systemic. The extremist left in Germany focuses on the fight against ‘capitalism’, ‘fascism’, ‘neoliberalism’ and ‘emperialism of the West’, while besides calling for the rejection of the classical model of typical democracy for forms of ‘social self-government’ or ‘autonomous chamber’. Groups specified as Autonome Antifa, Interventionistische Linke or Ende Gelände operate in the form of protests, demonstrations and frequently besides sabotage of infrastructure, demolition of property and direct attacks.
In 2024, the services noted 3,013 crimes motivated by leftist ideology, which is simply a slight increase compared to 2,865 incidents in 2023. Of these, 480 had the character of physical force – including beatings, assaults on public officers and violent disruption of political assemblies. 17 attacks were straight targeted at police, and another 59 active the demolition of public infrastructure – specified as bus stops, railway cars, road installations or offices.
Particular attention has been paid to the frequency of attacks on the MP offices of the CDU, FDP and AfD parties – a full of 127 specified cases have been reported during the year. In many cases, perpetrators utilized paint bottles, bricks or makeshift pyrotechnic charges, leaving behind ideological slogans, but symbolism associated with the “anti-fascist” movement. The services besides point to the increasing problem of climate violence, where utmost activists sabotage energy, industrial or transport infrastructure.
One example of this kind of action was the Letzte Generation (Last Generation) group's action, which blocked Berlin's main arteries, sticking to the asphalt and pouring oil paint on the road, which led to the communication being stopped for 5 hours. Although the protest was officially "peaceful", there were incidents involving the fire and police, whose vehicles were stuck in traffic jams. Otherwise, activists of the same group invaded the Hamburg airport runway, which resulted in their arrest and accusations of disorderly conduct of "special importance".
The BfV study besides highlights the phenomenon of alleged masking radicalism through the language of human rights and equality slogans. any left-wing groups are working with the support of political foundations and non-governmental organisations, which gives their activities the appearance of legality and hinders countering. This is besides the reason why extremist left-wing extremism is socially little stigmatized than its right-wing counterpart, despite the usage of akin methods of coercion, force and propaganda.
Increased activity of the services has besides been noted against alleged anarcho-communist groups, operating mainly in Berlin, Leipzig, Hamburg and Dresden. These are exceptionally hermetic environments, utilizing encrypted communication and offline meetings. Their goals include attacking symbols of state power, capitalist corporations, and spiritual objects. In 2024 12 cases of arson of vehicles belonging to courier and energy companies were identified, which were linked to this category of extremism.
An interesting but worrying conclusion of the study is that left-wing extremists frequently benefit from loopholes in the law and “at the border of legality”. They organize events under the cover of artistic happenings, conduct training from "civil resistance" and apply tactics confusing law enforcement. For example, any Antifa activists were observed during street training in Berlin, where they practiced cutting off police barriers and evacuation of wounded.
Although the services point out that the organizational scale of the extremist left is lower than that of the right, they inform that disregarding this phenomenon threatens to further radicalize young people – especially in university environments. BfV points out the request to monitor more closely the links between environmental, alterglobalist and anti-capitalist movements, which frequently penetrate and make a hard to identify opposition structure.
In conclusion, left-wing extremism in Germany, according to the Authority, is not a dominant threat, but cannot be marginalised further. Despite less cases of force than on the right, the actions of left-wing radicals frequently have the character of well-organised social pressure, damaging assurance in the institution and legal order. Moreover, their social acceptance in certain environments is simply a barrier to the effective consequence of the state. The state of law must respond consistently – whether force is on the right or on the left side of the political scene.
Islamism – a permanent and multilayered threat
Islamist extremism remains 1 of the most complex threats to German interior security. Although in public debate it no longer occupies specified space as it did a fewer years ago, German peculiar services inactive treat this area as critical. The Verfassungsschutz 2024 study shows that there are about 27,200 people in Germany associated with the muslim ideological spectrum, of which nearly 2,100 were considered possibly dangerous – capable of carrying out a terrorist attack. This number has remained stable, worrying for respective years.
Islamism – in the operational sense of BfV – is an ideology aimed at replacing the democratic legal order with a form of regulation based on shariat. Salafists, swingers, fundamentalist groups from the mediate East, as well as average Islamist organizations specified as Muslimbruderschaft or Millî Görüş, have a common denominator: rejection of secularism and principles of pluralism. Not all of these organisations call for violence, but many of them apply the alleged "step strategy" – first cultural and social expansion, then political pressure, until confronting state institutions.
In 2024, German services reported 948 muslim crimes, of which 124 cases active physical violence, including beatings, assaults and criminal threats. Compared to left-wing or right-wing extremism, these numbers are lower, but Islamism has different dynamics. It's a threat dispersed, permanent and frequently hidden, focused more on radicalization, logistics and infiltration than on open street violence.
The phenomenon of online radicalisation remains a key challenge. Platforms specified as Telegram, TikTok, Odysee and closed streaming services are utilized to disseminate jihadist content, fatw translations, method instructions, and speeches of preachers known for hating the West. In 2024, more than 70 active recruitment channels were identified, any conducted in German, indicating the deliberate reaching of the local Muslim community.
Among muslim crimes, the most common were:
- promoting terrorist content and incitement to force (292 cases),
- raising funds for prohibited organisations (e.g. Hamas, Al-Ka’ida),
- creating or supporting illegal spiritual schools (about 60 cases),
- disrupting the functioning of educational and judicial institutions,
- and force in families, forced conventional practices and forced matrimony (not formally included in statistic but included in the qualitative analysis of BfV).
One of the most serious incidents of 2024 was the thwarted effort at the Dortmund bombing, scheduled by a 29-year-old Syrian citizen associated with the alleged "Hessen-East Cell". More than 6 kg of chemicals, detonators and a video manifesto were found in his apartment, referring to the ideology of the muslim State. This is the second specified case in this region in 2 years – indicating the existence of real, active structures.
The study besides pays large attention to legal parallelism – i.e. the existence of social enclaves, mainly in cities specified as Berlin, Duisburg, Frankfurt or Bremen, where informal "Sharic courts" operate in parallel with German institutions. In these environments, state law is not accepted, and young people are raised in a spirit of opposition to constitutional values. The BfV signals that the deficiency of intervention in specified cases creates a space for further separation and radicalisation.
The activities of umbrella organisations – foundations, educational associations and “religious cultural centres” that function as facades for extremist groups are peculiarly important. any of them receive funds from abroad – Turkey, Qatar, Iran – and the study notes that in 2024 financial transfers with a full value of more than €5.2 million were detected, directed towards “politically-religious” activities. Investigations are ongoing and the accounts of these organizations have been temporarily frozen.
An interesting aspect of Islamist extremism in Germany is the improvement of alleged soft influence strategies, e.g. through participation in local social structures, immigration councils or attempts to form an educational program. The authorities of respective states (Berlin, North Rhine-Westphalia) identified cases where persons associated with Millî Görüş participated in the work on school materials for learning muslim religion. Although they are formally legal, the BfV highlights their political nonsubjective and contradiction with the rule of world-view neutrality of the state.
Youth radicalisation is besides a concern. In 2024, 74 attempts were made to influence public school students by illegal spiritual teachers or spiritual mentors. In any facilities in Berlin and Stuttgart, there was a situation where students refused to participate in “incompatible to Islam” classes, citing the recommendations of “spiritual authority” from the Internet.
Experts emphasize that Islamism in Germany operates on 3 levels: open (through foundations and mosques), hidden (preachers and the Internet), and strategical (political lobbying and demographic pressure). And although the bomb does not detonate all day, tension in the social structure increases – as evidenced by polling data: as many as 62% of Germans consider Islam a threat to German culture, and 47% fear Islamization of schools.
In conclusion, Islamist extremism is not only a terrorist problem, but above all a systemic and cultural challenge. It requires a state to have a precise balance between protecting spiritual freedom and combating attempts to undermine the foundations of the Constitution. Passivity means increasing strength of groups that in the long word can not only attack physically, but besides change the social scenery of the country from within – not necessarily with rifles, but through education, communicative and organization influences.
