On 1 April, the European Commission announced the ProtectEU interior safety Strategy. Completely unnoticed – virtually not discussed in the media – the strategy contains revolutionary operational solutions. The EC proposes "an ambitious redevelopment of Europol's mandate" to "turn the agency into a truly functioning police agency".
The erstwhile 2020-2025 strategy covered 4 reasonably vague priorities. The first was about "a future-proof safety environment" (including strengthening the safety of critical infrastructure, cyber security, protecting public places, etc.). The second referred to “to combat evolving threats” (the fight against kid pornography and hybrid threats, but above all to fight mis-, mal- and misinformation, regulation of online platforms to defend democratic institutions and electoral processes against abroad interference, etc.)
The 3rd precedence was to "protect Europeans from terrorism and organised crime" (stepping up Europol's competences, European government against money laundering, etc.).
The 4th pillar referred to the "strong European safety ecosystem" (further strengthening of Europol's competences and resources, deepening police cooperation, investigation and innovation).
The fresh strategy sets out 3 basic principles:
• affect "all citizens and stakeholders including civilian society, research, academics and private actors";
• take safety issues into account in all EU content and policies as part of a "coherent and comprehensive approach to security";
• mobilise more human and financial resources from the EU, associate States and the private sector.
It should be stressed that the second of these 3 principles refers, inter alia, to the Regulation on a "common asylum procedure" requiring associate States to keep asylum seekers who have not been authorised to enter the external border at a circumstantial location (up to 12 weeks for the asylum decision and, if necessary, to 12 weeks for the return procedure). This relates to the European Pact on Migration and Asylum. It besides refers to the "artificial intelligence" regulation, the "media freedom" regulation of 11 April 2024, etc. It concerns the defence of democratic institutions.
The interior safety strategy identifies 5 areas of work:
• enhanced EU safety capabilities;
• opposition to hybrid risks and another hostile acts;
• organised crime;
• terrorism and violent extremism;
• the function of the European Union in the planet and in global cooperation
Strengthening the EU's safety capacity involves expanding Europol's competences and staff (their number is expected to double). The EC wants fresh powers to better deal with fresh threats specified as sabotage, hybrid threats or information manipulation. It is so intended to propose an "ambitious redevelopment of Europol's mandate" to "turn the agency into a truly functioning police agency" and "better support associate States". The number of Coast defender and Border defender workers would besides triple. Eurojust's mandate (European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Justice in Criminal Matters) would be strengthened. In the margins, let us add that this enhanced cooperation would concern, among another things, the pursuit of "crimes" of the alleged hatred speech, etc.
The improvement of "resistance" and hybrid threats powers is besides envisaged. This includes combating the "traditional" threats to terrorism and organised crime, including those related to cyber attacks and any effort by Russia or another countries, groups, etc.
This is about "protection of democratic institutions and electoral processes". Needless to say, the EC wants to profoundly interfere with the competences of national states and their electoral systems and their national security. The EC besides expects "full-fledged intelligence cooperation at EU level", interfering with the counter-intelligence of individual associate States. It wants to harmonise any of the definitions of offences in the criminal codes of individual countries.
In particular, the Commission wants to make a sanitary cordon that would not let any non-institutional parties to take over, nor any organisations critical of the European task to rise funds or benefit from any, to implement a task that would be incompatible with the ‘values of the Union’.
The digitisation and data acquisition of associate States' police services are of large importance. The EC wants to circumvent the rules on the protection of individual data, telephone data and insists on implementing projects on "cross-border access to electronic evidence". The judges would issue orders straight to large Tech, which would be required to appoint a "legal representative" in the European Union in order to receive and process these orders quickly.
As the EC itself points out, the ProtectEU interior safety strategy includes "a set of stricter legal tools, enhanced exchange of information and enhanced cooperation".
In view of the expanding risks, including the hybrid "Europe must verify its approach to interior security". The fresh strategy aims to "optimise the Union's consequence to fresh and conventional interior safety threats".
"The strategy is intended to foster a change in culture in the field of interior safety and involves an approach that takes into account the general public: citizens, businesses, the technological community and civilian society. safety aspects will be taken into account in the improvement of fresh initiatives and the fresh European interior safety Governance Framework will support the implementation of the ProtectEU strategy".
During the presentation of the strategy, Henna Virkkunen, Vice-President of the Executive for Technological Sovereignty, safety and Democracy, stressed that "[in] the framework of the strategy presented, as well as the Union of Preparedness, the White Paper on the Future of European Defence and the Future Shield of Democracy, a imagination of a secure, protected and resilient Union was outlined".
On the another hand, Commissioner for interior Affairs and Migration Magnus Brunner pointed out that "[s]the ProtectEU strategy will aid us introduce a fresh safety culture in the EU and will supply us with better means to anticipate, prevent and respond to the risks of our interior security."
The fresh governance of interior safety in Europe will be based on a "modernised EU approach to interior security" including:
– identify the impact of Commission initiatives on safety and preparedness from the very beginning of the negotiation process and throughout its duration;
– regular analyses of interior safety threats to support the work of the safety College and the exchange of information within the Council;
– reporting regularly to the European Parliament and the Council to track and support the implementation of key initiatives.
An effective exchange of intelligence between associate States and the EU Single Intelligence Analysis Cell (SIAC).
More effective tools for law enforcement and enhanced JHA agencies will appear through the provision of digital data, fresh Europol powers, strengthening Frontex, Eurojust and ENISA and ensuring close cooperation between these agencies. The fresh critical communications strategy is to be strengthened to let cross-border communication between different authorities. The fight against "intranet threats" is to be decisive (full implementation by associate States of the CER and NIS 2 Directives, fresh cybersecurity act and fresh measures to safeguard cloud and telecommunications services and make technological sovereignty).
A fresh legal framework will appear for organised crime, arms trafficking, tracing and taking over assets from criminal activities, combating terrorism and "brutal extremism", preventing radicalisation.
The EU's partnership with key regions, specified as Latin America and the Mediterranean, is besides foreseen through the conclusion of global agreements through Europol and Eurojust, inter alia to establish joint operational teams and to strengthen the exchange of information.
While any cooperation measures to combat organised crime can be justified, those relating to "strengthening resilience" relating to censorship activities, including deep interference – as already done by the EC, e.g. the Digital Services Act (DSA) and the formulated concept of FIMI (referring to external interference in processes and electoral systems) – are absolutely unacceptable. Similarly, the creation of a "sanitary cordon" so that certain parties and organisations – recognised by the EC as "radical" – have no impact on public life.
The interior safety strategy for the coming years goes far into the future, consistently taking distant the key competences of states in safety matters and profoundly interfering with citizens' rights and freedoms.
The strategy is now available in English at: eur-lex.europa.eu
Source: poland.representation.ec.europa.eu, institutions.eu, eur-lx.europa.eu
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