PL-01 Concept – a spectacular prototype that no 1 has always ordered.
- Only a prototype was created on the CV90 chassis (available thanks to the OBRUM-BAE Memorandum, 2012) no qualifying tests or even preliminary investigation on the PL-01 prototype were carried out; the show in Kielce 2013 and the press drive in 2015 served mainly the CV90 Bofors marketing position of the MON program - deficiency of resources for improvement and "hard" military requirements.
- Undetectable for radar bodies with composite modules/RAM plates + active camouflage/non-solved cooling provided < 0.6 m2 of RCS and lowered the signature to ≥ 50 °C of the environment. The technology in 2013 was on TRL 4–5 – cost, mass, power and service exceeded the capabilities of the vehicle ~35 t
- The 120 mm cannon in the unmanned tower (RUAG CTG/L50) - an attractive ratio of firepower to mass required a western license, the import of vending machines and ammunition, which raised the price > €9 million per piece.
- The deficiency of consistent request on the part of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland - in 2013–17 precedence were: artillery (Krab), OPL (Wisła/Narew), aviation (F-35); the chepard program (light tank) was cancelled in 2017; the Land Forces headed for BWP Borsuk and dense MBT (Abrams/K2PL)
- The collapse of the consortium (BAE shifts forces to CV90 Mk IV; OBRUM consolidated in PGZ, focuses on Borsuku) without partner having access to the engine, RENK box, hydropneumatic suspension. MON expected at least 60 % of poloniumisation – not available with distributed sub-suppliers.
- The cost vs. effect - a light tank with STANAG 4+ armor would cost almost as much as the fresh Leopard 2A7, and offered worse armor. After 2014 (Ukraine-Russia) the precedence was opposition to PKP, artillery and drones, not "invisibility"
Chronology
- 09.2013 — MSPO Kielce: PL-01 model attracts planet media; MON does not enter the vehicle into PMT, hoping for a CV90 transfer under the Geiger program.
- 2015: The demonstration on the CV90 chassis rides the field; no decision to fund qualifying studies.
- 2016-2017: The priorities of the Land Army change after the fight analysis in Donbasa; in May 2017, the ministry officially deletes the Kepard.
- 2018: BAE ends engagement in Poland, focus on CV90 Mk IV for the Czech Republic and Slovakia. OBRUM goes with the squad to the Borsuk project.
- 2020-2022: PGZ signs contracts on Abramsy and K2 PL – the function of a light tank becomes unnecessary.
What's left of the project?
- RCS improvement and armor modules – any of the solutions went as know-how to the task of the "Stealth Turret" demonstrators shown by PCO and OBRUM in 2022.
- Unmanned tower interfaces – experience was utilized with the unmanned 155 mm "Krab-Next" cannon.
- Engineering squad – powered the Borsuk program and dense IFV PGZ.
Summary
PL-01 was an awesome marketing demonstrators, but had neither a defined Polish operational request nor the backing of military research, and after 2014, the priorities of the MON moved towards heavier, better armored platforms – that's why the task expired before crossing the threshold of the real arms program.
