The function of Native States in the Pacific War

According to the past textbook for primary school, the full Indonesia or Andamany was on the side of the Allies. In fact, it wasn't that beautiful.

In interior policy, the regions of South-East Asia were besides fragmented politically or tiny (except Vietnam) to successfully defy unification - and with this it was very different. Despite this, part of it undertook a fight or utilized the administration for civilian resistance. But it was the opposite. any even played 2 fronts.

Burma State (not existing before the war)

• Burma independency Army (BIA) XII 1941 – VIII 1942- at the entrance to the country: 2 300 soldiers (227 Burmese + 74 Japanese). After the offensive on Rangoon: 18,000 – 23,000 volunteers (part unidentified).
• Burma Defence Army (BDA) VIII 1942 – VIII 1943– formed from 3,000 selected BIA veterans (regular battalions trained by Japanese)
  – after additions in 1943: 9 000 soldiers.
• Burma National Army (BNA)VIII 1943 – III 1945 (after the creation of the state of Ba Maw) – 7 battalions + support troops: 11,000 – 15,000 people under Gen.

• A Summit of Organized Forces of Burmese Faithfuls Tokyo falls in 1943: approx. 15,000 in BNA + respective 1000 under-trained BDA recruits in retreat.

• The earlier 23,000 of BIA were a mass of volunteers, of whom the nipponese left only the best-promising, dissolving the rest.

• On 27 March 1945, BNA switched to the Allied side and took over power in Burma (the alleged Anti-Fascist Uprising) – since then it has performed as Patriotic Burmese Forces and has grown to ~20,000, but already against Japan.

Indonesia

"The State of the Sultans" (and another monarchs) – how did elected local rulers behave towards Japan (1942-1945)?

• Java - I'm sorry. Hamengcuwono IX, SultanateYogyakarta - I'm sorry.Tactical collaboration – ruler takes chūjō (gen. major) degree in Army 16, state supplies people to Heiho. He retained sovereignty and later helped nationalists-republicans
• Kalimantan Wsch. - I'm sorry. Aji Muhammad Parikesit, SultanateYou're a dick. cooperation – “Tenno Heika” swears and the ruler receives the nipponese title Koochi. He continued to regulation as an IJN tool.
• Nusatenghara (Sundan Islands) - Muhammad Kaharuddin III, SultanateMumbai and Muhammad Salahuddin, SultanateBima Both due to the fact that Japan's side – nipponese in 1942 transform their local armies into Keibitai troops. After 1945 they accepted the republic, but the reputation of "Japanese allies" stuck.
• Sumatra, Riau - Syarif Kasim II, Sultanate Siak Sri Indrakraura - opposition – refusal to deliver romush workers. He financed the underground, in 1945 gave the treasure of Siaku to the RI Academia.
• MolukiIskandar Jabir Syah, SultanateTernate - Open hostility – he provided intelligence to the Allies; in 1945 the Sultan evacuated by the Z-Force (Operation Opossum) commandos again took the throne after Japan's surrender.
• Kalimantan Zach. (Borneo) - 12 sultanates: Pontianak, Sambas, Ketapang, Sukadana, Simpang, Kubu, Ngabang, Sanggau, Sekadau, Tayan, Sintang, Mempawahzzbór opposition – the nipponese accuse them of “conspiracy”; all sultans executed 1943-44 (mandor crime). Headless country for a while

Why so different?

• "Musyawarah Para Sultan" policy. Tokyo offered loyal Sultans the rank of general-governor and maintenance of the court – hence any (Java, Kutai, Sumbawa) agreed to cooperate.
• Navy brutality in Borneo. Command of the 2nd Fleet recognized the rulers as possible allies of the Allied – hence mass executions in Mandor.
• Traditions - Sultans Ternate and Siaku had long-standing relations with the Dutch or British underground; they rejected “Great Asia” and yet entered into an alliance with the Allies.

Of the about Indonesian sultanates existing at the time of the nipponese invasion, at least 5 openly collaborated and at least fourteen (mainly in Kalimantan, Ternate and Siaku) opposed or were repressed for this opposition

Malaysia

The attitude of 9 rulers of the Sultanian states of the Malay Peninsula (Johor, Kedah, Kelantan, Negeri Sembilan, Pahang, Perak, Perlis, Selangor, Terengganu) against Japan - a state for mid 1945.

• Johor – sult. Ibrahim remained on the throne. Open cooperation (he maintained relationship with Gen. Yamashita, participated in nipponese ceremonies, exhibited romush workers)
• Kedah – sult. Badlishah (since XII 1943) deposed by the nipponese and Thais for 11 months. Opposition – refused to curse loyalty, supported Force 136
• Kelantan – sult. Ismail - retained power, but without salary; under the business of Thailand (province. Kalantan). Political objection – late at the ceremony, denied working quotas; sending data to British OSS officers
• Negeri Sembilan – Y.d.P. Besar Abdul Rahman – remained. He played 2 fronts – signed the orders of Kempai, but tolerated the hidden Malayan guerrillas.
• Pahang – sult. Abu Bakar - interned - then restored. Active opposition – the palace became the channel of the Force 136 communication with the Senoi Praaq guerrillas.
• Perak – sult. Abdul Aziz - remained - co-operation (preserved the MASCUA council, participated in ceremonies, but did not set up a combat team)
• Perlis – the paradise of Syed Alwi remained the full acceptance of the occupier – allowed to form companies of Giyūtai; decorated with the Order of the Rising Sun
• Selangor - sult. Hisamuddin (until I 1943) - sult. Musa Ghiatuddin (installed II 1943). Hisamuddin disproved for refusing to cooperate - the brother took over. Musa. Opposition (Hisamuddin)/full collaboration (Musa) – he was a shōshō degree, agitated behind “Great Asia”.
• Terenggan – sult. Sulaiman († XI 1942) - died 1942; the throne unplanted for surrender. deficiency of clear position (national council lavender).

What determined the attitude?

• The force of Tokyo and Bangkok – 4 sultanates (Kedah, Kelantan, Terenggan, Perlis) entered the sphere of influence - Thailand; the rulers there had to choose between loyalty and detronization.
• Their own dynastic interests – in Johor and Perlis states agreed to anything to keep economical privileges.
• Allied Canals – Pahang or Kedahu lay close the jungle, where British peculiar Forces (Force 136) operated; it was easier for them to cooperate

Vietnam

The position of Emperor Bảo Ðại (Đại Nam/Annam) in the occupied by Japan Indochina from September 1940 to March 8, 1945.

• IX 1940 – IV 1941 - The nipponese expeditionary corps occupies Tonkin, but leaves the Mandarin administration as well as Vichy officials. The Traité de Protectorat (1884) is formally inactive in force. The nipponese are stationed in bases. Bảo Ðại accepts the message of "reciprocal friendship" and... is silent. He does not declare his loyalty to Tokyo or to Free France.
• 1941 – 1943 - "Tributary": Stationed - Decaux + Staff of the 38th IJ Army. The Palace of Huï visited by Kempai's officers all month; the nipponese press for the emperor to publically condemn the Allies. He refuses specified occurrences, but accepts the Order of the Risen Sun (1942) – at the same time refuses to support the pro-Japanese challenger Cường Để
• 1942 - Reforms of the "Annamization" (Quốc Ngữ language in schools, Hue Academy). Increase the prestige of the court. The Emperor uses the minute to make an Advisory Council at the court and grow the palace secretariat – a silent game for autonomy among rival forces.
• 1943–1944 - nipponese propaganda of the large Sphere of Asian Prosperity. Tokyo wants to unite the court, but at the same time supports the daoist nationalists ("Ðại Việt", "Cao Ðài"). Bảo Ðại balances: – does not ban pro-Japanese parties in Hue, but does not let them to enter the palace. Signal: I stand by the protection system, waiting for developments
• X 1944 – II 1945 - Allies in the Philippines; Tokyo decides to overthrow Vichy. The nipponese by diplomatic channels are investigating whether the emperor is willing to proclaim a break with the provisions of the treaty with France. Answers ‘loyalty to the treaties lies in the nature of ConfucianismIt’s okay. ” He's waiting for developments.
• 8/9 III 1945 - Operation “Meigo”: nipponese disarm French garrisons. The proceeds of France are de facto expiring. General Tsuchihashi submits a draft of a declaration of break-up with all privileges for the Franzis only now the Emperor signs a rescript of 11 III 1945: "Wiruất Bảo Đại chiếu thư" and agrees to be the head of a pro-Japanese, baptised state.

Balance of attitude (1940-III 1945)

• Vietnam remained loyal to the formal French protectorate – until the French ceased to be as a real force, capable of defending them.
• He did not cooperate massively with Tokyo, limiting himself to insignificant gestures (order for the Emperor, receiving attachés).
• He did not support the opposition (Việt Minh, Free France); his strategy is to wait out and defend his own dynasty.
• When Japan forcibly removed the French, Bảo Ðại – having no longer been based in the real French army – accepted the nipponese script (March-August 1945).

Cambodia

From the surrender of France (VI 1940) to the nipponese coup (9 III 1945).

• VI 1940 – IV 1941 - King Sisowath Monivong's reign - since IX 1940, troops of the 5th nipponese Front have been stationed in North Tonkin, but interior governments in Cambodia are inactive unchanged
• • XII 1940 – IV 1941 - There is simply a French-Thai war going on; Cambodia is losing Battambang and Siem Reap to Thailand. Monivong is loyal to France. He does not engage in any dialog with Tokyo or Bangkok; in the Decoux dispatches, he asks only for guarantees of immunity of the capital. He dies (23 IV 1941) without signing any political act.
• IV 1941 – IX 1943 - the first 2 years of King Norodom Sihanouk's rule. The king is the 18-year-old Prince of Sihanouk.
• Japan is restricted to military bases; civilian affairs stay unchanged (the tri-power). Sihanouk publically declares allegiance to the protection treaty. He accepts nipponese military missions, but does not take any formal oath to the Emperor. He tolerates the arrest of monk-agitator boy Ngoc Thanh (VIII 1942), asking only for a mild sentence.
• X 1943 – II 1945 "Tokyo intensifys propaganda about the "Great Sphere of Prosperity"; he insists that the rulers of Southeast Asia condemn the Allied and admit the allies of Japan.
• The French propose a "romanization" of the Khmer alphabet.– Sihanouk refuses public radio-manifest against the Allied but accepts the nipponese Order of the Rising Sun.
• In the dispute over the alphabet he takes sides with France – he introduces a improvement designed in 1943.
• 9 III 1945 – action of the nipponese Army (Meigō Sakusen). The nipponese disarm the king's protecting French garrisons, intern Decoux, offer the rulers “independence in alliance with Japan”. 11 III 1945 Sihanouk releases the rescript of Wiruất Bảo Đại chiếu thư – breaking all the treaties with France and accepting the protection of Tokyo.

Sihanouk's central attitude (1941-III 1945)

• Loyalty to Vichy – until the defeat of 9 March 1945 the king did not violate any agreement with France; he was a valuable ally for them.
• Kind neutrality towards Japan – he maintained contact, accepted distinctions, but consistently postponed the decision of a formal alliance.
• No initiative of his own – he did not interact with the Vietnamese or Lao resistance; his strategy is to wait and save the country
• Only after the French disappeared (III 1945) – he accepted the nipponese script.

Philippines

Sulu Sultanate

• I 1937 – X 1950 - Sultan Jainal Abirin II (tambuyong). He was supported by the U.S. and Filipino guerrilla commanders; after 1944 General Douglas MacArthur. From 1942, he commanded an army, provided an interview for the 41st Division, and in VI 1945 met with MacArthur in Zamboand.
• I 1937 – XI 1950 - Amirul Umara II (Ombra Amilbangsa). He was supported by the Imperial Army of Japan (16th Army). He participated in the propaganda ceremonies of “Great Asia” and committed to supplying romush workers.

Other countries and countries of the Philippines (1942-45)

• Confederation of Lanao sulphanates (Maranao, Mindanao) Sultan Alonto, Busran Kalaw, Dimaporo. Armed resistance. The Maranao Army attacked the 108th nipponese Division all week. The conflict of Tamparan (IX 1942) crashed the nipponese company.
• Sultanate Maguindanao (Cotabato). Lord of Datu Gumbay Piang. Resistance: “Moro-Bolo Battalion” - Collaboration with Allies.
• High dates of Lumads and Igorots (north Luzon) - lords of lallakay and baknang (no sultan title). Resistance: They sent their own troops and led a guerrilla.
• Cases of accommodation (civil functions) - ruler of Domocao Alonto (maranao, September 1943–III 1944). "Double game" – he took a position from the Japanese, at the same time ordered the partisans to decision arms.
• The deficiency of clear pronipponian states–––Beyond Amilbangsa, no recognized sultan nor date declared loyalty to Tokyo in the long run.

Key conclusions

• The Sultan of Sulu was divided into 2 camps. The legitimately stronger Jainal Abirin II collaborated with the Americans; Ombra Amilbangsa accepted nipponese protection
• The vast majority of indigenous rulers of the Muslim South (Moro) – the sulthanatas of Lanao and Maguindanao – fought the nipponese alongside the Filipino-American guerrilla.
• Individual cases of "collaboration" were alternatively of a tactical acomodation (the adoption of civilian functions to defend the population) alternatively than an ideological alliance with Tokyo.
• The nipponese supported the administration at the Bureau of Constabulary and the puppet republic in Manila, not on conventional dynasties – apart from trying to usage Amilbangsa in Sulu.

Shan State

In most of the Shanas sided with the Allies; the open “customers” of Tokyo-Thailand were only four

• Against Japan - 22 states - interviewed the Allied Force 136 and the Chinese 6th Army, allowed British SOE officers to recruit Karen and Kachin teams; part (Hsipaw, Yawnghwe, Lawksawk) evacuated the government along with Chinese troops and returned with troops in 1944. Sao Shwe Thaik, Yawnghwe – later president of the full Burma commanded the military in the Nam Pane Valley.
• Sao Kya Hkeng, Lawksawk – the ruling household fled from Japan, supported Force 136 rally.
• Public or semi-public collaboration - 4 states of east Shans transferred to the business of Thailand (Operation Saharat Thai Doem). Keng­tung, Möng Pan, Möng Ton, Möng Hsāt. They accepted nominations in the Thai Army (Phayap Army) and provided people for road work for 15. nipponese Army. Sao Sai Long, Kengtung – guest of Thai staff in Chiang Mai; capital Kengtung utilized as Phayap Army headquarters.
• Inconclusive - 8 states - Sawbwa Mawkmai, Kehsi, Mongmit and respective smaller principalities in the Nam Tu Valley. - territories were on the front; they paid to supply food to both sides, but did not send regular troops on the Tokyo side.

Why the disproportion?

• The Thai business of the Golden Trinity – only the 4 easternmost states were under real, two-year Thai-Japanese business (1942-45)
• British and Chinese peculiar Forces – the remainder of the Shans experienced a jungle guerrilla war led from Kunming; Sawbwa, for fear of sanctions after the war (and with hope of maintaining privileges) preferred to aid the Allied (secret food warehouses, guides, bridge sabotage).
• Lack of nipponese “indigenisation” – Tokyo did not make the Shan Army like Indonesian PETA; in return, it attracted Romash workers, which deepened local governments' aversion

As a result, in August 1945 36. The British Division entered Lashio, no crucial Sawbwa attempted to defend the co-laborative position quo; everyone immediately recognized the return of the British and—a period later—the anti-Japanese, unifying Burmese government.

Solomon Islands

How did the conventional states of the Solomon Islands behave from 1942 to 45?

• Pro aliancy (Australia --> USA) - an alliance with 90% of about 250 local chieftains. The chiefs set up scouts for the Coastutchers. Intelligence, hiding survivors, USMC leadership in the jungle. Jacob Vouza (leader, Guadalcanal) – hero. Chief Kaleko (Vella Lavella) – boat network for the evacuation of 330 airmen
• Neutral/passenger - A twelve chieftains (mainly tiny Santa Cruz & Duff Islands atolls) declared “we do not interfere”; they gave the jungle to guerrillas, food to both sides behind kauri shells. No open support for Tokyo; no armed action.
• Collaboration with Japan - a maximum of 3-4 chieftains - tiny tribal forces fought for Tokyo, leadership in the jungle, transportation of palm wood. Reports of Coastwatchers' position – Alika Koli's chief (St. Choiseul) – captured by Marines I 1944.
• Two Ringi chief brothers. – they got nipponese titles; they escaped after bloody pacification of their country.

Why did almost everyone stand by the Allies?

• The memory of the British mission and trade – since 1893 contacts with London meant medicine, tools, education; the nipponese associated only with the cutout
• Immediate brutality of IJA – 11 civilians were shot in Nggela in February 1942 for hiding an Australian missionary; the message spread throughout the archipelago.
• Coastutchers strategy – British-Austrian officers (Mason, Martin-Cleary, Read) operated in the patron-client system: they left the radio, medicines and guaranteed the evacuation of families.
• Adventist leaders and catechestes – frequently respected in villages; The SDA Church and the Melanesian Church openly called for aid to the Allies.

Summary – The frequently American word "Fuzzy-Wuzzy Angels" is not hyperbole: in practice, the full Solomon Islands (only a fewer exceptions) supported the British, Australians and US Marines. The collaboration with Japan is limited to individual front-end guides.

Palau

Rubak – clan elders of 16 conventional Babelthuap states + pair of highest chiefs: Ibedul (Koror) and Rubasch (Melekeok). (each state had an oligarchic row of two/three rulings). As of 1914 under the curate of the nipponese administration (Nan-yō Chō), the nipponese attempted to limit the function of native governments.

• Cooperation with Tokyo ~30–32 chiefs– Ibedul Tetchibér and Rubasch G. Reklai signed a commitment in 1942 to “support the imperial administration”. The Oligarchs Ngatpang and Aimeliik supplied plots for manioc cultivation for the 14th Army. No state has set up an armed force – at most civilian fortifications.
• Help the Allies - 6–8 chieftains– Ngchesar and Ngeremlengui chiefs kept in contact with Robert Synnot (US Navy Coastwatcher) and provided reports on IJN movements. Ngaraard – Ucherbelau, together with the catechet O. Muil, led 17 Allied prisoners to the island of Ngercheu (1944). After landing the USMC on Peleliu (IX 1944) respective rubaci from Aimeliik, Airai led Americans' paths through mangroves.
• Public military collaboration - None. fewer young Palauans incarnated into the "teishintai" (ancillary aviation) not by decision of the chiefs.

Why was the vast majority only passively loyal to Tokyo?

No viable alternative– the chiefs had no contact with Allied forces until 1944.

Tough control of Kempai – immediate repression was threatened for hiding survivors (e.g. the Melekeok village case, VI 1943).

No weapons – nipponese did not form indigenous troops; The Palauans were workers at Ngerur and Peleliu airports.

Cultural attachment to the “peace of the village” – the rubak is primarily liable for the continuity of the clan; an open revolt would exposure to repression.

Micronesia

• West Carolina - Yap (“bulche”) - Ulithi-Woleai (laman) - 14 chieftains - cooperation - provided coconut and workers supplies; no reports of typically military cooperation. They sent people to work at the Yap base; they wouldn't let the Allies in.
• Truk (Chuuk) - the leadership of each lagoon - 22 (at 7 atolias) - respective helped coast-watchers: e.g. Chief Table (Namonuito) supplied food with USN patrol (1944); the remainder neutral. Transportation of boat reports to subtropical Hall Islands islands
• Pohnpei and Kusaie (nahnmwarki; soumas) - of the 11 chieftains at least 4 resisted intelligence: Nanpei-Weite nahnmwarki supported communications to Australia. Coast-Watcheroom 1943-44 supplied rice and warned the population against nipponese movements.
• Marschalla Islands (Ralik-Ratak) - 10 chieftains - delivered workers to Kwajalein and Jaluit; 1 (Iroij Lablab, Ailinglaplaplaplap) delivered scouts to IJA (1943). Working support
• Guam - 8 maga’låhi (rad) all supported USN after the desant (VIII 1944), previously - opposition (hiding priests, eating). Driving Marines in the paths of Fena, Fonte
• Nauru - clan chiefs - neutral.

Why so small open collaboration?

• No offer from Tokyo: Micronesia according to the League of Nations was to be a demilitarized area. Japan did not foresee the acceptance of indigenous troops (as opposed to Indonesia or Burma), so the water was not expected to "fight for Japan".
• The nipponese recruited Romush or repressed full villages to Rabaul; the chieftains formed an alliance likely under the threat of repression
• Mission schools & old contacts with Americans (especially in Chuuk and Pohnpei) made any of the leadership more eager to aid hidden coast-watchers than occupiers.

Brunei

• until XII 1941 "Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin agreed to have the British Resident set up the Brunei Volunteer Force and the peculiar Police division (total of 200 volunteers) to defend oil fields. This force disintegrated before the first shot – 16-22 XII 1941 troops of the 35th IJ-Army Brigade occupied Belait, Tutong and the capital without a fight.
• XII 1941 – VI 1945 - nipponese occupation, Miri Province. The nipponese left the Sultan in power, the local government led the Secretary of State of Inche Ibrahim under the orders of the Miri garrison. Sultan appeared publically with General Maeda, accepted the Order of the Risen Sun and planted rice in the run of "food self-sufficiency". The Allies considered these gestures to be ceremonial collaboration without military significance. No Brunesian troops on Japan's side. The individual escapes to the Sarawak partisan (North Borneo Volunteer Force) sources talk of a full of respective people – no native group was formed fighting Japan.
• VI–VIII 1945 - Australian landing. The Sultan welcomed the 9th AIF Division in the capital 17 VI 1945. The Allied investigation showed that he did not actively cooperate with Japan – he remained under the protection of the Allied troops in the palace. The local Malays and Dusuns served the Australians as guides, but it was front improvisation – their numbers did not exceed 100-150 carriers.

How to measure Brunei’s position?

• Prior to the invasion, the Sultan was loyal to the British and agreed to recruit a volunteer squad.
• After 22 XII 1941 (no Allied garrison). Brunei had no area for military maneuvers. The Sultan retained power, which the Allies considered forced and "without crucial cooperation" after the war.
• The actual collaboration was limited to respective civilian officials; there was not a single Brown armed formation fighting alongside Japan.
• The social cost of war (romusha, rice confiscation, hyperinflation of “banan money”) has made the Sultanate welcome the return of the Allies positively.

Papua fresh Guinea

How did the Papuas and the fresh Guineans respond erstwhile the Imperial Army entered their islands in 1942?

• Regular soldiers - Papuan Infantry Battalion (since 1940). Reconnaissance patrols, ambushes, guides for AUS/US troops; nicknamed "Green Shadows". supplies of ammunition by Kokoda, evacuation of wounded, construction of airports

• Papuasi forced or inclined to work for Japan - Staff of the 17th Army and garrison of Rabaul - 2,300 porters (2,000 from Rabaul + 300 from the north of Papua) Moving Kokoda supplies towards Buna-Gon; advanced desertions, many killed for disobedience. Active armed collaboration - no cultural formations; casually single guides rated at < 500 people. sporadic occurrences of local notebooks, respective tour guides, a fewer prison camp guards

What determined specified disparity?

• They had been in contact with the Australians since the beginning of the 20th century and did not treat her as an enemy; the nipponese saw her as invaders.
• Behavior of the occupiers – after the first massacres in Aitape, Buna and Rabaul (1942) the support of villages for ANZACs increased, desertions from the nipponese cerate were massive.
• ANGAU strategy – Australians tried to keep communications with clan chiefs; this gave moral advantage.
• Lack of nipponese Indigenisation Policy – Tokyo did not effort to usage Papuan battalions like PETA in Indonesia

More than 50,000–55,000 indigenous people in Papua fresh Guinea served the Allied origin (from the PIB/NGIB soldiers after the celebrated "Fuzzy Wuzzy Angels") and the number of conscious nipponese collaborators did not exceed respective hundred.

Andamany?

There were no countries in the archipelago in the western sense: each of the 4 indigenous groups – Jarawa, Onge, Sentinelsi and the large Andamans – lived in small, egalitarian hunting and fishing teams without hierarchy, army and tradition of service to strangers.

• Great Andaman Island (Port Blair, Bamboo Flat) – In the spring of 1942 the nipponese occupied Port Blair; Andamanese Home defender station (18 large Andamanians) dissolved, people were forced to grow vegetables for the garrison. respective Jarawa from the confederate jungle were driven to chop wood in Haddo. Jarawa – respective attacks of indigenous forces on nipponese patrols; no data on killed on both sides.
• The Ritchie Archipelago (Onge) - Japanese patrol boats only approached for coconut water; no posts were established. Onge withdrew their forces into the jungle. No armed contact or cooperation was recorded
• Northern Sentinel - Neither the British nor the nipponese landed on the island. No contact = no participation
• Allied Operations (1943-1945) - The British commando “Special Operations Group” landed erstwhile (II 1944) on small Andaman – without the engagement of natives. Jarawa – informing shots towards whites, then retreat into the forest.

Why did it look like that?

• Minimum cultural contact – before 1942, no group, apart from any of the large Andamans, maintained permanent relations with the British; no 1 knew Hindi or English adequate to negotiate.
• The strategy of "escape into the forest" – Jarawa and Onge reacted to any abroad (British, Japanese, Indian) the same for decades: a fast departure from the coast or an ambush and immediate withdrawal.
• Japan's policy – garrison (c. 3,000 IJA/IJN soldiers) focused on building bases in Port Blair; indigenous ones were considered unfit for military usage – they were only tried to usage them as forest labour.

Native Andamanians did not fight on either side and did not join any military formations.