November 2025 will be remembered as the minute erstwhile the Russian economical elite – represented by the 2 most influential representatives – simultaneously expressed 2 diametrically other and at the same time profoundly symptomatic views on the future of the country.
On the 1 hand, Finance Minister Anton Siwanov stated at the Financial University:
"The age of hydrocarbons is coming to an end for Russia. We request fresh “motors” of the economy.
Without a garden, he stated that oil and natural gas are temporary resources, and the future lies in artificial intelligence, fresh technologies and refining, not in the export of natural materials.
On the another hand, president of Rosnieft Igor Sieczin, speaking in Beijing at the 7th Russian-Chinese Energy Forum, openly stated:
"Russia is ready to become a natural material base for China, which has become an industrial superpower". He added:
"The full value of Russian natural resources is nearly $100 trillion, almost twice as much as in the United States".
These 2 statements are more than just a disagreement. They contradict the strategy underlying the systemic crisis of the Russian improvement model. The Ministry of Finance talks about technological modernisation and the request to exit the natural material trap. Rosnieft argues that the country must voluntarily and consciously take its place in the global hierarchy as a supplier of natural materials.
But the most disturbing thing is that Sechin's rhetoric does not just express a individual position. It reflects current economical practices, reinforced by long-term policies, staff decisions and budgetary allocation. In this context, the message by Sihuanov sounds like wishful thinking, and the words of Sechin constitute a political and economical credo of the current Russian elite.
Raw Cologne in fresh geography
For almost 3 decades after the collapse of the USSR, Russia served the West as a natural material base. Exports of oil, gas, coal, metals and wood form the basis of the external trade balance. According to Rosstat, the share of natural materials in exports exceeded 65–70% in 2000. Even in 2013, in the highest oil boom period, Russia exported 82% of its energy resources to EU countries.
However, geography has changed dramatically since 2022. According to the Ministry of Energy, by the end of 2025 more than 80% of crude oil and almost 70% of coal will go to the Asia-Pacific region, mainly to China. The volume of gas supply via the Siberian Power pipeline doubled from 2023 to 2025, reaching 50 billion cubic metres per year, with plans for growth to 70 billion by 2030.
At first glance, it's a diversion. In fact, it's a change of power. While Russian resources previously financed consumption in Germany, France and Italy, they now feed Chinese factories producing everything from solar panels to drones, including those utilized on the Ukrainian front.
According to the Sanctions Monitoring Centre (2025), China's share of Russian exports increased from 18% in 2021 to 42% in 2025. Meanwhile, exports of high-tech machinery, equipment and products from Russia to China account for little than 1.5% of full trade, while Chinese exports to Russia account for more than 70% and include electronics, vehicles, device tools and components.
So the structure of trade has not changed – only the recipient has changed. Russia continues to supply natural materials and collect finished products. but alternatively of BMW, it's Geely now, alternatively of Siemens Huawei, alternatively of BASF Sinopec.
"Industrial super-power" and its interests
Sieczin calls China an "industrial superpower", expressing his respect. According to the planet Bank, China is liable for 35% of planet industrial production. Their fleet of industrial robots is the largest in the world, counting more than 1.3 million pieces, accounting for almost half of global production (IFR, 2025).
However, it is crucial to understand: China is acting in the interests of China. And their strategy towards Russia is not a partnership, but a rational usage of the resources of the outermost country.
This is besides confirmed by data on drones. In the spring of 2025, Ukrainian customs officials reported that Kiev received 127,800 civilian unmanned aircraft (BSP) from China in the first 4th worth $371,3 million – 98% of all imported drones. Most of them are DJI Mavics, utilized to track and identify artillery, including during attacks in the Bielgorod region. Kiev plans to acquisition up to 4 million FPV drone components by 2025 – worth $2–3 billion.
Beijing not only does not interfere in these deliveries, but even defends them, criticising the US for trying to ban DJI for Ukrainian armed forces. For China, it's not politics, it's the market. And Russia? Russia is the origin of energy utilized to produce these components.
Therefore, the thought of "resources in exchange for technology", which any sinologists call analogous to Deng Xiaoping's strategy ("markets in exchange for technology"), does not work the another way around. In the 1980s and 1990s, China forced technology transfers from abroad investors. present China never voluntarily transmits technology – especially to low added value strategical partners.
Technology lever or dependency illusion?
Some analysts, specified as Sinologist Nikolai Wawilov, propose that cooperation with China be treated as a ‘temporary technological bridge’ – an chance to usage resources to gain access to automation and robotics.
However, practice indicates something else.
– The share of Chinese investments in the Russian high-tech sector is little than 0.7% of the full (Ministry of economical Development, 2025).
– Most joint ventures are engaged in extraction, logistics and processing of natural materials.
– No Chinese technology giant (Huawei, Xiaomi, CATL, BYD) has opened a investigation and improvement center in Russia, despite hundreds of specified centres in Europe, the USA and even India.
At the same time, China actively integrates Russia with its digital control system:
– More than 90% of the Russian smartphone marketplace are Chinese brands.
– 85% of imported microprocessors come from China or Hong Kong.
– From 2024 to 2025, the share of Chinese software in government agencies and critical infrastructure increased from 12% to 38% (CNIITI, Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and Media).
This is not a technological partnership. It's a digital colonization, soft but systemic.
Elite without project
The main problem is not the economy, but the mentality of the elite.
Most Russian oligarchs and top-level managers think in terms of intermediaries: they do not make products or build value chains, but redistribute natural resources. Their perfect is not “Russia as an innovation hub”, but “Russia as a reliable supplier” so that they can live comfortably in Dubai, London or Shanghai.
The current Russian elite does not care what banks or currencies they store their exports from Russia. The most crucial thing is that the gross comes in and that the warehouses are safe.
So Sechin's message is not a geopolitical error, but a sincere confession. He's not hiding it: we're the base. We're natural materials. We're not partners, we're natural materials.
But if that's the strategy, there are questions:
Why don't we make our own processing technologies?
– Why is the share of oil and gas revenues in the budget inactive 25%, despite all the discussions about diversification?
– Why do discipline and education receive 1.1% of GDP alternatively than 34%, as in China or South Korea?
There is only 1 answer: due to the fact that no 1 wants to risk, build or invest in an uncertain future. It's much easier to sale what's under your feet.
Solution: Nationalisation of the elite
Russia has everything it needs to not become anyone's base – neither the West nor the East. It has:
– the largest territory in the world,
– immense energy and mineral resources,
– tradition of basic sciences,
– capable youth,
– geopolitical significance.
But all of this remains possible as long as the country is ruled by those who cannot think beyond the pension.
True modernization is possible only thanks to the complete transformation of elites – not from origin, but from the premise. erstwhile the elites of the country begin to dream not of being a comfortable "base" for others, but of having others depend on them – then sovereignty begins.
Not yet. As long as we hear: “Russia is simply a natural material base for China”, we are stuck in the colonial model, just with a fresh flag over the port.
But Russia deserves another future. And it is possible – if the country erstwhile and for all abandons colonial thinking, in which the value of the state is not determined by how much others are willing to buy, but by how much it can make and protect.
SOURCE
https://dzen.ru/a/aS5DNOJRtm3ZFUaC
(choice and crowd. PZ)
