The upcoming elections to the European Parliament are also test, as the will to change in October's vote for Parliament is sustained by a social majority. Do we have a chance that organization rivalry will be won by a formation another than the Law and Justice? Will attendance surprise us as in autumn, or will it disappoint us as in fresh local elections?
When preparing pre-election investigation at the Institute of the Polish National Council for Poland, we wanted to answer these questions, but besides to realize the relation between the most likely forecasts and to see what the current run and the current distribution of social opinions tell us about the dynamics of Polish and Polish relations with the European Union, the perspectives and threats to Polish democracy.
The survey results discussed in the study came from a survey commissioned by the Institute of Political Critics by Ipsos on 8-12.05.20124 on a random example of 1,000 adults of Poles and Poles. The qualitative survey included 6 group interviews with young women, conducted on 9-11 April, a week after the first circular of local elections, with 3 of them held in a tiny town (quotes with code P), 3 in large (codes W and K).
In both locations, groups of akin age structure were selected: women 18-35. The recruitment included 2 additional filters to choice participants with progressive views. The survey and the group interviews cited were carried out as part of a task financed by the European Parliament.
Grill and Sofa Coalition
Who wins the election? little than 2 weeks before the vote, we can be certain of that. As in the fresh local elections, and this time the largest group of Poles and Poles will attract Coalition Grilla and Kanapa. Only the scale of her triumph is unknown.
The turnout in Poland has this to do with that significantly increases in poll declarations before and after the vote. It falls on election Sundays. Therefore, as many as 75% of the participants in our poll can be placed among fairy tales that they will vote this time. To estimation the likely result, we will usage the simplest trick. We will destruct those who say that they will vote alternatively than leave only those who are firmly convinced of their participation. This gives us a more realistic turnout of 48 percent.
On 9 June, election abstinence will prevail, with a consequence of 52%, and any lower consequence will be a surprise.
How will the voices of those who go to the urns spread? all 3rd (32%) voter wants to vote for the Civic Coalition and it seems that this time she will win in triumphing over the organization of Jarosław Kaczyński. Law and Justice have 3 followers less. The 3rd Road and the Confederate fight for a place on the podium with 10 percent support. Despite the most pro-European agenda, the fresh Left can only number on 7%.
If only the determined people had gone to the elections, the hierarchy would have been similar, although the advantage of KO and PiS over the another groups would have been greater (both leaders would receive a full of 70% of the votes).
Who can you number on at the urns?
The erstwhile parliamentary elections (October 2023) were characterized by evidence advanced attendance, which is attributed to the very advanced polarization of the political scene and the temperature of political dispute in Poland, as well as to the fact that the possible of apostasy from the regulation of the Law and Justice became real, which was especially crucial for younger voters, including women. It seems that this situation will not happen again this time, as it was during the local elections.
In order to recreate the motives and reasons which are guided by those who will go to vote, as well as those who are highly likely to stay at home, we have compared the responses of respondents to the question of whether and how they voted in the last parliamentary elections with whether and how they want to vote in the upcoming elections to the EP. In this way we are able to say who has the most faithful electorate, and who is the most capricious, what another parties are considering voters of individual committees and what prompts people to stay in their homes.
The most consistent are respondents who did not participate in the parliamentary elections. They're not going to vote this time either. As many as 92% of those who do not receive MPs and senators do not intend to leave the grill and TV.
Among organization electorates, the most loyal (ready to vote for representatives of the same group as in autumn 2023) are KO voters. As many as 85 percent of those who voted for the Coalition in the elections to the Sejm and the legislature want to vote again for its representatives in the Euro-Elections. Loyal, although to a somewhat lesser extent, are besides voters of Law and Justice (75 percent of voters from autumn want to vote for this group in June elections to the EP) and the Confederation (78 percent).
The left electorate (59%) is more Labile, and especially The 3rd Way (Only 45 percent of voters who gave Holownia and Kosiniak-Kamisha parties specified a strong position in the present Sejm will vote for its candidates in the Euro-Elections). 21% of voters who voted for the Left in October 2023, do not plan to participate in the June elections. In the case of the 3rd Way, this is up to 24 percent. Additionally, 16-17 percent of the voters of both parties who declare to participate in the EP elections, this time intends to support candidates of the Civic Coalition.
It can be said, therefore, that while the electorate KO, the PiS and the Confederacy is disciplined and loyal, so the voters of the 3rd Way and the Left are changed in their electoral sympathies, and in any case they let voting for another parties, even if they yet vote according to their first choice. This shows a good consequence to the question of the first and second parties among those who declare their willingness to participate in June elections, even if they are not certain who they will vote for.
If these figures are compared with the distribution of the support of the various parties presented above, it points out that the 3rd Road and the Left are not only mentioned more frequently as a first-choice party, but besides have a large "reserve" electorate that could in certain circumstances vote for these groups. In addition, the Holowniak-Kamisha organization has the smallest negative electorate (38%).
Elections of the third-rate meaning
How to explain specified a low expected attendance? The influence on the readiness of Poles and Poles to participate in the vote is not only the temperature of political dispute in Poland, but besides the conviction about the importance of certain elections. In particular, we have looked into the opinions of women from younger age groups (up to the age of 39), as their collective participation in the fresh parliamentary elections has mostly outweighed the balance of triumph for the benefit of democratic parties.
If you look at the historical data about attendance in Poland and compare it to the European average, you gotta say that we are reluctant to go to elections. Politics and public affairs are not our passions. Most of us, if they're going to the election, that explains the upbringing and the sense of duty. The phrase "participation in elections is our civic duty" is most likely the most frequently given answer to the question of why people participate in elections. In practice – although we feel it is an work – we do not always have adequate determination. This is simply a small more common in elections with advanced stakes and simple rules (presidential elections, somewhat little parliamentary elections).
Against this background, elections to the European Parliament are the least popular in Poland. Political polarization has raised their turnout from 20-24 percent recorded between 2004 and 2015 to almost 46 percent in 2019, but even self-government elections, let alone parliamentary or presidential elections, attract more citizens to the polls. Group interviewers gave many reasons for this:
“Local elections are crucial due to the fact that I live in my city and I want individual competent to rule. The European Union is of small interest to me" (K1)
“I have specified a problem with the Union that I feel least that it should contact me” (K1)
“Elections for the Europarliament are more hard for Poles. Poles do not feel European.” (P1)
There is clear talk of civilian alienation from European democracy. The EP elections seem little crucial than national elections, we do not believe in their translation into crucial matters for us, and we do not trust candidates that they are guided by something more than the anticipation of individual benefits.
In the case of elections to the EP, the rule of voting as a civic work is weakening. Participation in the EP elections is seen by little than half of the respondents and only 41% of women before 40. fewer of us (31 percent of the full surveyed and only 23 percent of women by 39 years) feel that voting can make a real difference. Even little (25% of the full surveyed and only 15% of women) sees an chance in these elections to settle crucial matters for themselves.
This seems to be confirmed by 1 of the conclusions of focus interviews: Poland's presence in the EU is seen as something obvious, alternatively affirmative and working, so we do not have circumstantial expectations and urgent demands – it is to be as it has been.
Euro-Parliamentarians themselves have besides earned the image of the European Parliament. Only 1 in 5 women surveyed (and only 12 percent younger women!) believe that people who care about affirmative changes are starting to the EP. The conviction that the position of the Euro MP is simply a reward for merit in national policy and a warrant of a rich wage and a generous retirement has been established.
Demobilisation of young women
The intention to participate in the election is the strongest explanation of age. The older the respondents, the more they declare a strong desire to vote on June 9. Nearly 70 percent of people aged 60 and more definitely declare that this day will go to urn, among 20 and 30-year-olds it is about 35 percent. In the youngest age group (up to 29 years old) there are besides clear differences between men, of which 50% declare a willingness to vote and women who want to go to polls 31 percent.
Most of our interlocutors and interlocutors declared that before the fall elections they had no interest in politics or in very small interest. What has led to a increasing interest in politics, erstwhile it occurred and to what degree is this permanent phenomenon?
One group became curious in politics as a consequence of participation in protests following the announcement of the judgement of the Constitutional Court of Julia Przyłębska in causing abortion. The second, larger group of our respondents are those who decided to take part in the elections to the parliament shortly before the vote.
A large proportion of the focus participants we led, especially the youngest ones, admitted to a complete deficiency of political knowledge. any declared a complete deficiency of interest in this sphere of life:
"I did not go to the elections now (self-government – PS), politics is not my area and as if I were going to go with the musu, and I had another plans for that day. On the another hand, in October, I went a small bit with the musu. I turned 18, so possibly it's time to vote, but politics doesn't. It's like I'm focusing on myself and my life, and I'm all about empathy, openness and so on." (W1)
If they are not curious in politics, why went to the urns in October? What was this “mus” mentioned by the above - mentioned interlocutor? Well, the atmosphere formed before the elections was conducive to change. The reluctance of young people to the Kaczyński organization took the form of election mobilization. There was a fashion for voting, in any groups taking the form of social coercion of participation (those who admitted to the planned election abstinence had to number with social ostracism). This was besides done by well-groomed professional campaigns. So it turned out that voting was just a red card shown to the PiS or a affirmative consequence to call to action.
The commitment resulting from women's strikes built the climate of these elections. The desire to play PiS for tightening anti-abortion laws, driven by the promotion campaigns, resulted not only in fashion, but in social coercion to participate in elections. The first months of operation of the fresh government, despite many announcements, did not bring any change to women's rights. Could this have affected the demobilization of the electoral parts?
In the study, we tried to capture the perceived gap between the expectations of the subjects that the government should deal with and the assessment of whether it actually deals with them during the first months of its activity. As a consequence of these 2 perspectives, a map of the gathering and unmet needs of respondents is created.
Young women who voted in the autumn and do not want to vote in June anticipate – and do not see the effects – to improve working conditions, the availability of housing, the protection of Polish agriculture and the simplification of taxation burdens. The issue of relaxation of abortion rules is crucial (5 out of 16 elements). 74% of this group of women consider it a priority, and only 41% consider it a precedence for the government.
However, this gap is even greater for the aforementioned issues. This is confirmed by the results of group interviews, which at the time of the inauguration of Donald Tusk's cabinet was implemented by the Institute of Political Criticism. Although the majority of women voting for the then democratic opposition as the main reason for participating in the elections pointed to the issue of regulating abortion and women's rights, it was futile to look for these demands on the list of their expectations made to the fresh government. This was confirmed by the results of the Iposos poll showing that the percent of those curious in politics and declaring their willingness to participate in the next elections in both key groups had already reached the levels recorded respective months before the elections.
The exception was only the youngest (18-25 years) left-wing election. The ones with which we talked powerfully stressed their expectations regarding respect for women's rights and greater human rights. In opposition to the tightening of abortion law, they saw the main origin in October's mobilization, and the Women's Strike saw as 1 of the most crucial political events:
"Daughters, mothers, grandmothers, full families went to these protests" (P2)
"The women's protests were most memorable to us, and those women who conducted these protests, they got into the parliament, they encouraged and they were our voice, we put them on" (P2)
“In addition to this, the Law and Justice have created a civilian war between Poles over the past 8 years, which has caused us debts and harm. I am not personally in favour of any party, due to the fact that all organization that enters the parliament enters only 1 thing, for money. Human rights, women's rights and opposition to the current ruling party, or PiS" (W1)
Although there have been voices defending the ruling coalition against allegations of non-fulfillment of election promises, disappointment over the inaction of the fresh power on women's rights prevailed, and more knowing attitudes faced strong opposition from most women:
“For me, it was much more crucial to reconstruct abortion law. They should take care of it first. They deal with it, but they don't have 1 vision, so I feel cheated. During the campaign, everyone said they would do it first. 1 organization does it, the others block it, and women inactive endure from it. The fact that I will settle them after a year will not change the fact that any 100 women cannot legally execute abortions” (K1)
“If it was parliamentary, we women wanted to fight for our rights, we were promised that there would be a pill, there would be abortion, and at the minute it is frozen and waiting. We are disappointed as women, and hence I think these people hesitated due to the fact that they did not know what to do or whether to proceed voting for the organization that promised them or not” (P2)
“because he said what we wanted to hear, and he got into power and it's not that crucial anymore. To me they are hypocrites, they broadcast on that party, they promised that they would do it, and erstwhile it came to that, it was nothing” (P2).
Although it is hard to recognise that this disillusionment of the deficiency of advancement on mitigating current abortion rules is the most crucial reason for the electoral demobilization of younger women, it seems likely that this reduced by respective percent points the result of the ruling coalition, taking electoral primarily the Left, for which the electorate was the most crucial issue. Paradoxical, therefore, although the issue of women's rights has harmed the 3rd Road and Simon Holovnia, the formation of the Black One, Biedron and Zandberg pays for it.
Mobilized: What ignites electoral passions?
A advanced turnout in the elections to the European Parliament could only be expected in 1 case: if the pre-election run took on the character of the dispute over Poland remaining in the EU and gave the vote to the plebiscite. Nothing like that happened. Although the Law and the Confederation have set themselves up as EU critics, their leaders did not call for Poland to leave EU structures. In specified a situation, the dressing up of the organization of the ruling coalition in the feathers of defenders before Polexit besides did not give electoral effect.
Most respondents (56%) are convinced that there is presently no real possible of Poland's exit from European structures. If you limit yourself to people who are politically active, this percent is even higher – 63%. Therefore, the argument that participation in the elections is besides an issue that could affect Poland's membership in the EU itself, did not resonate among voters, and attempts to flirt with this position by any politicians were read as polling topography of social emotions.
In specified a situation electoral mobilization based on another emotions, its fuel turns out to be old, but seemingly inactive surviving division into the PiS and antiPiS, which rewards the 2 largest groups on the Polish political stage. The most powerfully motivated to participate in the upcoming elections are voters of Law and Justice (94 percent of those willing to vote, including 65% decisively) and the Civic Coalition (95 percent and 69 percent respectively). Voters of committees proceed to effort to play more or little for depolarization: Confederations (92%) and 52%), 3rd Road (87%) and 54%) and Left (86%). This rivalry between the 2 main forces, taking the form of a individual duel by Jarosław Kaczyński and Donald Tusk, ignites electoral passions and draws to the urns of the most "convoluted" political supporters.
So we have 2 opposing tendencies in this election. On the 1 hand, these are clearly little crucial choices. It is simply a political regulation that in specified elections voters tend to support smaller parties. They avoid tactical voting, and are more guided by “the voice of the heart”. This, as well as the previously noted large reserve reserve reserve of the reserve electorate (those for which the 3rd Road and Left are parties to the second choice) should make these committees able to number on a somewhat better consequence than the polls show. Unfortunately, the influence of this origin is balanced by polarization, which, in the absence of others, has become the only magnet to attract voters to the urns.
The fact that Poland's departure from the EU did not appear on the political agenda is good for Poland and bad for attendance. This does not mean, however, that this is not the case in the future. Let's look at what long-term trends and processes can foretell the results of today's research.
Conditional Euro-enthusia
Today, half of respondents are referred to as strong EU supporters, 11% as opponents, and 29% have chosen the option: it is hard to say – there are arguments for and against. Euroenthusiastic are the electorates of the fresh Left (99%) and the Civic Coalition (87%). 1 percent of the voters of these formations are considered opponents of Poland's membership of EU structures.
At the second pole, there are Confederate voters, where all 3rd is an opponent, and 37% are treated by transactional membership. This second attitude is most widely represented in the PiS electorate (up to 45 percent), in which additionally supporters prevail over opponents (32% to 20 percent). In the 3rd Way electorate, 2/3 respondents are referred to as Polish supporters in the EU, and for 30% there is simply a question dependent on the benefit-cost ratio.
The respondents in the focus interviews saw the increase in Euroscepticism and felt that the threat of Poland's appearance from the EU could act to mobilise young women, but the majority felt that this position was very distant. Poland's presence in the Union seemed apparent to them and did not affect the upcoming elections with this issue, so they negatively assessed the anticipation of utilizing it to mobilise the electorate.
They themselves most frequently declared their commitment to European values and welcomed Poland's membership of the European Union, indicating the benefits it brings for us, especially in terms of freedom of travel and security.
"We form a community, is Erasmus, there is aid for us, protection of the country in the framework of security, human rights are emphasized and travel is facilitated" (W1)
"New opportunities have opened up especially for young people. I besides have the impression that the EU is firmly committed to young people, there are programmes, grants, support for young people to drive, learn as much as possible. If a fewer countries decide, okay, we do it like this, there's a better chance that this will happen than everyone else will. And that cultural diversity, more opportunities, more travel, more sightseeing. For me, the EP elections are to vote for those who want to stay in the Union.” (W1)
Security was the second subject in the discussions about the European Union alongside freedom of travel. The investigation participants dealt with this subject themselves, asked about the benefits of EU membership and expectations, for example: concerns about the war in Ukraine:
“I am afraid of war. This is an unimaginable situation for me that I would gotta pack and flee the country, so for me it is the most important.” (P1)
"The European Union makes us feel safe to any extent." (P1).
“This is simply a war in Ukraine and what is happening scares me, and safety is most crucial to me.” (W2)
“The most crucial thing he expects from the Union is security, due to the fact that there is war in Ukraine and as a parent I fear for my own and children and safety and for everyone here.” (P2)
In both these areas, however, it turned out that the benefits of being in the EU were not entirely clear (how does the EU warrant safety if it is not a defence pact and has no army of its own?) or are apparent and natural, like travelling. Only a fewer investigation participants pointed to the function of the EU in maintaining democratic standards and the regulation of law, and even little frequently referred to them as values in themselves.
‘Gazeta Wyborcza’ in last week's poll asked Poles how they would vote in the referendum about Poland's continued presence in the European Union. It turned out that its results would be better present than in 2003, and the percent of opponents would fall by half. It's true. However, those who chose the Union then gave it unconditional love. Today, a large group of "eurorealist" voters is noticeable.
Its ranks may increase in subsequent years, especially as in certain circumstances the proportion of respondents who think it is time to leave the EU is increasing. We asked the respondents about 9 specified circumstances, among which they were so inevitable (Poland becomes a net payer), likely (a departure from the rule of unanimity), to be completely unrealistic (depending on the payment of EU funds from mandatory additions of insect protein in food).
The loudest "non possumus" can be heard in the context of the script of making the payment of structural funds dependent on the consent to proportional amounts of migrants and Treaty changes aimed at moving distant from the rule of unanimity (37-38% in favour of leaving the EU). Close to 1 3rd of the surveyed will support Polexit erstwhile Poland becomes a net contributor or if membership would be conditional on speeding up the implementation of the climate commitments package or mandatory usage of insect protein in national food processing plants.
A combination of 3 of the 9 is adequate for at least half of the respondents to support Polexit. The most dangerous "mix" would be to lay down the following circumstances: a departure from the rule of unanimity, a conditionality of EU subsidies with the adoption of the euro and a proposal by the EU's largest countries for Russia to end the war in Ukraine. With this combination, 52% of respondents believe that Poland's time in EU structures is over.
And here's the large difference between electorates. The most eager to postulate Polexit are the electorates of the Confederation and Law and Justice. However, for the vast majority of voters of the fresh Left and civilian Coalition, Poland's membership in the EU is simply a substance of rule and indisputable, that neither the weakening of Poland's political position as a consequence of the departure from the rule of unanimity nor the climate issues rise no uncertainty about the pro-EU course in more than 16-22% of the voters of these parties.
New Climate Negativeism
Nothing seems to have sounded as frequently in the context of the upcoming EP elections as the violent protests by farmers against Green Deal. In Poland, where the additional background of the conflict was the decline in grain prices caused by, according to the protesters, mainly illegal marketing of Ukrainian products, the demonstrators demolished the area of the Sejm's building, threw racials and cobblestone at the police. Under force from protesters in many EU countries, the European Commission has announced changes in the Green Łódź. Nevertheless, the mobilization of farmers proved to be expanding and gaining more and more social approval, resulting in considerable confusion among the rulers. So we decided to look closer at the attitude of voters towards climate change and climate policy.
We're dealing with a paradox here. On the 1 hand, the percent of people convinced of the seriousness of climate challenges, their anthropogenic origins and the urgent request for action in Poland is expanding (in our survey it agrees with these issues after nearly 50% of respondents, erstwhile the number of strong opponents oscillates around 10%). On the another hand, the number of those who consider the Green Deal and another actions taken by the EU to be besides radical, threatening our standard of surviving and competitiveness or convincing that precedence should be given to countries with climate impact ("let's wait on the US and China").
Interestingly, unless it is amazing that 90% of Confederate sympathizers and 67% of PiS supporters think that the Green Deal should be immediately cancelled and that the EU's climate policy should be redesigned, it turns out that among the Euroenthusian voters of the fresh Left and civilian Coalition this view supports 42 percent and 45 percent. Similarly, on another issues specified as the fact that EU climate policy is besides radical. In all cases, right-wing voters begin to pursuit the voters of the fresh Left and civilian Coalition, about 40% of whom (sometimes more often) express doubts about the direction of combating climate change.
This apparent paradox is easy explained by examining the fresh climate strategy of the populist right (I analyzed it in Last year's study New Climate Negativeism, based on large studies carried out by CBOS). The favourite business of populists is to look for global “conspiracy” hitting the national interest. Climate change is simply a global problem, and by definition the effort to counter it takes the form of global agreements.
So the right abandons tough climate deniism by saying that climate concerns are exaggerated. It adjusts the communicative to the climatic awareness of the "weapon". It focuses on negating policies designed to counter global warming or undermine their relevance. By intertwining these narratives, populists attract not only political radicals and people desperate for rising costs of life, but besides more and more "ordinary citizens".
Interestingly, this communicative is besides more and more effective for those groups where different positions could be expected: young people, PO voters or Left electorate. Research, which was conducted by CBOS at the beginning of last year on behalf of the Foundation, showed that in coal regions, where the concentration of negationist transmission was peculiarly high, the level of rejection of climate policies among the elections of the right was the same as in the remainder of the country, but higher among PO and Left voters.
The survey we are discussing here has yielded results indicating a disproportionately advanced level of dissatisfaction with EU climate policy in the Left electorate (too fewer numbers of this group of respondents do not let to draw far-reaching conclusions from this). This is besides confirmed in the focus that we had with young women with alternatively progressive views.
Only a fewer investigation participants have welcomed EU policy as a tool to combat climate disaster. The vast majority of this dimension of EU action was considered insignificant or even harmful. any of the interviewers noticed the problem, but they either felt helpless towards it (“There are restrictions imposed, but so what if the stars fly by private jets 20 kilometres. Until the planet changes, we are able to do very small ourselves" (P1), or to push it distant into the distant future ("I am not an eco-crazy." This is important, but I feel that it will not happen in my lifetime, so it does not bother me so” (K1). There were besides very critical voices: “This is nonsense, due to the fact that they just had them exchange inputs in iPhones and make tons of trash themselves” (K1).
Anti-EU narratives are increasingly reaching interlocutors. For the time being, they are comparatively resilient and are able to criticise the bias of these sensational reports ("And just specified a narrative, not that innovation, but the anticipation that Germany each eats you worms", P1) and even express concerns that issues specified as the Green Deal or farmers' protests will be utilized to mobilise the right. (P2).
But the drop digs the rock. The strategy is already beginning to bear fruit. If there is an effort in the close future to "put" Polexit into political debate and to make it a subject that polarises political division, it is likely that EU climate policy will be a pretext. Politicians of the ruling coalition should realise this, and alternatively of competing with the right in criticism of the EU's climate policy, they must begin to work on its better adaptation to the image of Poles and Poles, and their electorate is immune to the propaganda of the right.
