"The only task of the Constitutional Court is to measure the conformity of laws with the Constitution. The dispute came from the fact that Prof. Rzeplinski exceeded his powers" – akin arguments will be heard from many officers of the regime. In the photo: my Facebook talk with a pro-government writer (I blurted out the name, but the photo, set up an appeal for the release of Sawchenko, which I otherwise support).
It seems that this is simply a written message of the day, due to the fact that we encounter it as frequently as (equally absurd) "the leak of the judgement has shown that the Court is mocking the law, after all, a fewer hundred-page judgement should arise on the last day of the trial by brainstorming".
This note is intended to be a hand-held arsenal of competitors – I will dedicate it to those provisions of the Constitution, which mention to the competences of the Constitutional Tribunal another than “assessment of the conformity of the laws with the Constitution”.
Let's start with regulation 189. It is simply a good counterargument against those who claim that the Constitutional Tribunal has exceeded its powers by interfering in competency disputes between the authorities of the state. This article says that "The Constitutional Tribunal settles competence disputes between central constitutional authorities of the state".
Other powers are referred to in Article 131 (determining the engagement of the Constitutional Tribunal in the procedure of uncovering an obstacle to the President's office), Article 188 p. 4 (giving the Constitutional Tribunal the right to measure "constitutionality of the objectives or activities of political parties", Article 133 and in part Article 183, on the right to measure global agreements.
Article 186 refers to the assessment of "normative acts insofar as they concern the independency of courts and the independency of judges", and here we come to another interesting issue. Even where the Constitution talks about the evaluation of laws by the Constitutional Court, it adds something like "or another normative acts".
This is simply a very crucial addition, due to the fact that in the intention of the legislator it protects us from trying to force something that will not be called a "legislature", but will actually be. Let's say, the Sejm will say that this was not a bill, but a resolution (but at the same time this resolution will effort to impose or invalidate any legal regulation).
When Prof. Rzeplinski answers questions specified as ‘who gives you the right to decide what is allowed by the Sejm?’, he gives answers of the kind ‘Constitution’, it does not truly sound good from a drunken point of view. 80% of housewives from Gdańsk most likely see it as arrogance.
But neither I nor he can aid that it is. The Constitution places the Constitutional Court as a brake change which may violate constitutional order, i.e. service the central authorities to change the Constitution informally.
I realize that individual doesn't like the constitution. Let him gather the constitutional majority and change it. She's gone, even if we number his quasi-coaliciant, Kukiza. It's hard, let him play these chess according to the rules, not trying to flip the chessboard or call the pawn a lady.
I have already written this a fewer times, but I will repeat: yes, I would anticipate the same after the Prime Minister Zandberg, if erstwhile my option had won the election. I think that in politics, the question of "who should rule?" is more important, "how to make the state so that you do not even fear the power of individual who you think should not rule."
The PiS wants to regulation without any brakes and it likes (some?) supporters of the PiS. I don't like the thought of not having these brakes, no substance who's in power. And I appreciate the wisdom of the founders of the constitution who installed these brakes.
