Paulina Siegień: What happened in Moldova on October 20? The final consequence of the elections and the referendum is positive, but don't you feel that something went badly wrong, especially given the pre-election projections?
Eugen Muravschi: The consequence of the referendum is positive, but the difference in the number of votes was small. I believe that before the elections we underestimated the scale of the Russian operation, although we were aware that Russia had been building its network in Moldova for months and was paying people for their engagement in it. Russian agents failed to bribe many people on the day of the vote. For this, those who had been paid by Russia for respective months through the oligarch of Ilan Shora were many adequate to shake the result of the elections and the referendum. These people were not seen in public research. erstwhile you do a poll, no 1 will say to you, “Yes, I have pro-European views and I want Moldova to enter the EU, but I got money from Shora, so I will vote against.” This was not in surveys or in in-depth interviews. Therefore, it was so hard to estimation this phenomenon.
Wojciech Siegień: Would people who have pro-European views truly be willing to vote in a referendum against changes in the constitution?
Those who are profoundly convinced of the thought of European integration are not. But voters who were undecided could have done so. In the consequence of the referendum, we see that the regions of Moldova, which have been so far pro-European, voted against the changes in the Constitution. It was unexpected.
W.S.: How can this be explained?
The run led by the government and the surroundings of Mai Sandu was insufficient. They were besides confident. All the polls showed rather a certain advantage of the pro-European option, so they thought it would be a part of cake. More had to be done, better explained the intent and sense of the referendum vote. According to our investigation in WatchDog, about a 3rd of respondents did not realize the question on the ballot. It wasn't a simple question like, "Do you want to go to the European Union?" It was a question of support for changes in the constitution, indicating circumstantial articles, so people did not know precisely what they were voting on and what would happen if 1 or the another option won.
In addition, voters who vote for pro-Western and pro-European forces are more demanding and critical. If they felt disillusioned with the conduct of the government and the president – and had reason to do so – they simply did not go to vote. Pro-Russian voters are more criminal and better organized in this respect. Pro-Russian forces have besides successfully convinced people that this is not a referendum that concerns the European future, but a referendum on the popularity of the government and Sandu itself. You don't like the current government? Simple, vote in a referendum to show it. In conclusion, any people voted in this referendum for them due to the fact that they were paid for, and they did not truly have an opinion on the subject and did not realize what European integration was about, and any due to the fact that they were disappointed by the current government.
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The government and Maia Sandu were incapable to build tensions around these elections as deciding choices about the future, about the way forward for the next 100 years. Instead, there was talk of a "Sandu referendum" from the beginning. It was already a mistake to announce it, linking the referendum with the president. She was besides accused of not being able to build a broad pro-European coalition. The referendum should be presented as a joint task of all pro-European forces in the country, not just 1 party. That's not what happened.
P.S.: In addition to political actors, there are besides social actors, e.g. non-governmental organisations, who besides conduct their campaigns in relation to elections, usually pro-training.
WatchDog was part of the Citizens for Europe initiative, in which we visited smaller towns across the country to talk to people, to explain to them the meaning of the referendum. But we don't have the resources and resources the government or the ruling organization has. We only have a fewer volunteers. I myself was in 12 towns. In parallel, another NGOs conducted akin campaigns. But even at the same time, if the government and political parties neglect the campaign, we as NGO cannot compensate. We're not here to do their occupation for them.
P.S.: What questions and doubts did the people you met in the Citizens for Europe run have?
Like I said, quite a few people didn't realize the mention question. They said, "Yes, we want to go to Europe, but if we vote for it in a referendum, can Sandu do what she wants with the constitution?" We had to explain that there were only 2 circumstantial modifications. I besides remember an old woman who said: “Shor gave me 600 lei to vote for him. If PAS gives me 1000, I will vote for them.” She spoke very openly about it. Pro-European local politicians have frequently complained that Shora is buying the voices of the poorest and most susceptible people. For many of them, especially for pensioners, it was a way to supply themselves with bread, buy basic goods. Shora's money sometimes even doubled their basic income.
W.S.: So everyone knew and saw everything, but they had no thought how to fight this thing effectively?
The police were conducting actions and investigations in this case, trying to confiscate money from the people who brought it into the country. But besides, what could you do? They couldn't have arrested 100,000 people. I hope we can halt and justice those who were at the top of this pyramid. The next thing is the police are investigating, collecting evidence, and then the remainder is up to the DA. It's the D.A.'s office that decides if the case goes to court and with what charges. I hope that this full strategy will work more effectively before the second circular of presidential elections. And it will continue, due to the fact that next year we have parliamentary elections and we cannot afford to see Russia and Shore proceed to weave the pro-Kremlin network in Moldova and buy votes.
P.S.: In the first circular of the election, Maia Sandu was the only pro-European candidate. If Alexander Stoianoglo, her second-round competitor, takes over the votes of even any of the another candidates, then...
He's got a shot at most and he's gonna be the fresh president.
P.S.: It was an incredible script before the election.
Usually the pro-European candidate gains additional votes in the second round. People who are disillusioned with the government have shown this by not going to vote in the first round, but can mobilize at the second. Regardless of the feelings they have towards Sand and the government of her organization of Action and Solidarity, they do not want to have a pro-Russian president. So there's inactive area to increase her support. But among pro-Russian candidates, not all are friendly. I'm not convinced they can make a united front. Which is why I think Maia Sandu inactive has a chance of winning.
P.S.: What would Stoianoglo's triumph mean for Moldova's European aspirations?
At least for a year we will inactive have a pro-Western parliament and government. Moldova is not a presidential republic, so the prerogatives of Stoianoglo would be restricted. Only the majority in the parliament for the organization from which the president originates gives him more opportunities. His triumph carries a hazard precisely due to the fact that he will be more likely to win pro-Russian forces in next year's parliamentary elections.
P.S.: Is there inactive time to make a fresh pro-European political force? The party, the movement?
An effort was made to build a European coalition for the presidential election, but the parties that were to participate in it did not agree. Apart from PAS, they have very low support, sometimes it is only 1%, so they do not give hope that in the fresh parliament Sandu would have individual to form a coalition with. There may be individual new, but there is small time, and of those pro-European parties that are presently operating, no in my opinion has a chance of exceeding the 5% electoral threshold.
W.S.: Do you fear for the future of Moldova, its European aspirations, after the first circular of presidential elections and after the referendum?
This is disturbing, but the final consequence has shown that the referendum has been approved. A tiny majority, but inactive won the pro-European option. And that means the constitution will be changed. It will include the nonsubjective of joining the EU. It's very important. Despite the complications we have observed on October 20, I believe Maia Sandu is the favourite of the second circular of elections. If he wins, it will besides be a good signal before the parliamentary elections. Her constituents will be more mobilized, more optimistic. But if the presidential elections now win Stoianoglo, it will surely be a hazard to Moldova's European pro-Western trajectory.
P.S.: In order to effectively gain support for the thought of European integration, it is essential not only to affect politicians in Moldova, but besides to support the European Union itself, its institutions, associate States. Is it enough?
There are politicians coming to Moldova from the EU and the countries that belong to the Union, and we have cooperation at many levels, survey visits, etc. 1 problem is that it is hard to find the full amount of the EU contribution to Moldova. These are various funds and investments, any of which go through the European Investment Bank, any through the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, any in the form of soft projects for NGOs, any as hard investments in individual regions of the country. So erstwhile individual asks me that, I can say that the Union is giving us a lot, but I do not know how much specifically. The EU institutions could be more transparent in this respect, due to the fact that politicians and people with pro-Russian views build this argument: The Union is constantly giving any money, but we cannot even see if they are all going where they should be, and if the government is not stealing them due to the fact that we do not know precisely what amounts we are talking about.
W.S.: Moldova has a large neighbour who is simply a associate of the EU with whom it has a very close cultural, linguistic and historical ties. Is Romania has its own not so separate from the EU, but a circumstantial policy towards Moldova?
Bilateral relations are very intense, Romania supports Moldova in various forms. This is economical cooperation, but besides the function of our lawyer in Brussels, which Bucharest takes on. Unfortunately, Romanian politicians usually bet bad horses in Moldova. Whenever they tried to support this or any another pro-Western and pro-European party, they always chose the incorrect one. They erstwhile supported the erstwhile Chisinau mayor Dorina Chirtoacă of the Liberal Party. Chirtoacă studied in Romania, was friends with Romanian politicians, was considered a large young hope for Moldovan politics. But then his organization was drawn into corruption schemes, and then allied with Plahotniuk (a corrupted oligarch, accused, among others, of trafficking in human beings, who in the second decade of the 21st century subjugated most areas of the state and economy of Moldova – ed.), after which it dissolved.
People and Moldova and Romania were disappointed. It must be admitted that the Romanian authorities were highly tolerant of Plahotniuc and many Moldovans resented this. Now they look favorably at the Chisinau mayor Ion Ceban, who has been pro-Russian his full life, and now pretends to be pro-European. Romanian social democrats seem to have advanced hopes in it. Although his pro-Europeanism has late been manifested mainly by the fact that he at least did not agitate against the referendum. Always something. We will find out on the occasion of the parliamentary elections, which goal Ceban plays, but this is simply a very opportunistic politician, so 1 can anticipate another volt.
P.S.: From what you say, politicians in Moldova are seldom idealists and more frequently opportunists.
Many pro-Russian politicians in Moldova are opportunistic people who simply like money. And pro-Russianity guarantees at the start a large part of cake, due to the fact that it is about 30 percent of society. Even Ilan Shor was not immediately pro-Russian, erstwhile even invited Euro-Parliamentarians from Italy to Moldova. The affair ended that they were invited by the oligarchs who financed this visit. But the beginning pro-Russian Shor remained only erstwhile he began to have problem in Moldova. So yes, many politicians are in politics for money only.
P.S.: possibly it's better if they're opportunists in love with money than if they were genuinely attached to the thought of a Russian miru? At least there's area for manoeuvre.
Indeed, what they are genuinely attached to is Russian money, but unfortunately Russia has quite a few money, especially for Moldovan conditions. For example, you can buy a organization with that money. Until recently, the best way to identify which political organization in Moldova is the favourite of the Kremlin was to watch which tv channels retransmit Russian propaganda programs. Initially it was channels controlled by the Socialist Party, then passed to Shora channels. This change was at the same time a sign that Russia is putting Shora in Moldova as a force that will prosecute Moscow's political interests. In 2022 the retransmission of Russian channels was banned, but earlier these were the most popular tv programs in the country. Russian tv is rich, so it had a better offer than Moldovan stations. Not only political and publicist programs, but besides films, series, entertainment. Our stations could not compete with this offer.
W.S.: If, from the results of the referendum on 20 October, the votes of the diaspora were to be deducted, the pro-European option would have failed in Moldova itself.
You say to subtract the voices of the diaspora, and I say to subtract the votes that Shor bought – then it turns out that the situation is not so bad. It's specified a speculative electoral math exercise. If we had no Russian electoral corruption in the country, we might not request diaspora in the west. But right now her influence acts as a balancing force for Shora and Russia. In the erstwhile presidential election, Igor Dodon utilized the argument that the diaspora should not decide for us. But why not? Without the money the diaspora sends, our economy would collapse. If the diaspora sends a billion euros a year to the country, can it affect what is happening in Moldova?
W.S.: Does Romanian policy, which allows Moldovans to get a Romanian passport rather easily, play a affirmative function in the EU integration process? possibly people are not mobilizing politically, due to the fact that more than half of them are already citizens of the Union.
Romanian passports allowed Moldovans to see Europe. This allows them to travel and face European reality with the transmission of Russian propaganda. Many of our citizens work in the countries of the European Union. They can do this legally, they work in better conditions than if they were economical migrants outside the Community, they have social and legal protection. I don't think that's bad. Romanian citizenship has allowed many Moldovans to live better in the European Union, sending more money home, which is crucial for our economy. too these families in the country, these people tell good things about Europe, they set an example. possibly many people who went to work in Russia went to Europe due to the fact that they received a Romanian passport. In general, it was a good thing for us. Even Russian-speaking Moldovans frequently have Romanian passports, although they do not know the word in Romanian.
P.S.: People in advanced state positions may have a abroad country passport?
Maia Sandu has a Romanian passport. In Moldova, more than half of the population has or has already applied for Romanian citizenship.
W.S.: erstwhile there is simply a peace agreement, let us hope for 1 that will benefit Ukraine, will this besides change the socio-political atmosphere in Moldova?
When the full-scale war began in 2022, pro-Russian sentiments in Moldovan society subsided and the number of people who wanted integration with the West increased. But in time, people got utilized to the fresh reality, and the percent of both returned to prewar standards. The nucleus of the pro-Russian electorate here is about 25-30 percent of society. I am not convinced that even erstwhile Ukraine wins the war or erstwhile the war ends in a way that will guarantee Ukraine's safety and improvement opportunities, these people will cease to sympathize with Russia. But the end of the war will surely breathe more optimism in pro-Western Moldovans and may stone voters who are undecided and now sit on a barrier between old and new, Russia and Europe. It will be easier for specified ones to make a decision.
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Eugen Muravschi – Moldovan think tank expert WatchDog.MD Community, which focuses on building social opposition to misinformation and manipulation narratives. WatchDog.MD mission is to build the environment for the democratic improvement of the country by monitoring social and political processes.
