This is the second part of the conversation with Michał Sutowski, author Political biography of Alexander Kwasniewski, dedicated to the period from the circular Table to the 1995 presidential election. The first, concerning the times of the Polish People's Republic, we published on 23 November – you can read it at this link).
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Łukasz Łachecki: It is the year 1989, the breakthrough minute has arrived, Kwasniewski is the top of the sinking ship. And what happens then?
Michał Sutowski: Immediately after the election, Kwasniewski understands that the scale of the defeat of power is so immense that “Solidarity” must enter the government and may even include the portfolio of its boss. Sam personally, without consulting the top, made the thought known to his fresh colleagues on the another side. True, he assumed that the solidarity Prime Minister would regulation with the PZPR, not with its satellites – and that he would be in this government himself. But, of course, he did not decide it – about the Mazowski Prime Minister decided the full array of factors, specifically the triangle: Jaruzelski, Wałęsa and the Church. At the same time Kwasniewski realized very rapidly that his organization was only suitable for resolution.
Partial concrete after 45 years of power is besides ready to rapidly admit defeat?
When Jaruzelski becomes president at the end of July and resigns as First Secretary, the party's power includes Mieczysław Rakowski, who is convinced that he will rebuild it – and will most likely lead something new. Of course, he wants Aleksander Kwasniewski, who refuses him, to be a part of this reconstruction.
Your own mentor?
Rakowski offered him the position of KC's propaganda secretary. Kwasniewski's refusal was considered treason, and the secretary was yet Marek Król, later editor-in-chief of the weekly "Wprost" and fierce anti-communist in fresh years.
On the another hand, although the June 4 elections did not confirm it, the PZPR is inactive a colossal one, even if on clay legs. There was no temptation for this upcoming rebranding to run a somewhat thinner line?
Kwasniewski already knows that entering the camera at this minute can only harm him. He doesn't want to be part of the old party's last leadership, but he's starting to play for his influence on the construction of the fresh party. And we know this from the memories of prof. Jerzy Wind: in September 1989 he wrote that Olek is very critical of Rakowski and that he clearly measures in leadership.
Then he rules Mazowiecki.
The solidarity government is starting to face the reforms and global situation of Poland, so the PZPR people can take care of themselves. Kwasniewski starts to look for allies, and the alleged Movement of July 8 is helpful here, or “the faction of assistants”. This is simply a group of young PZPR members associated with universities, specified as Tomasz Nałęcz, Danuta Waniek, Zbigniew Siemietkowski, Hieroni Kubiak from Krakow, Kazimierz Kik or most likely the oldest of them Prof. Jerzy Wind. They immediately after the election request the dissolution of the organization and the creation of a new, social democratic one. They think against organization concrete, which is then heavy lost, but also, as it turns out, against Rakowski. due to the fact that he thinks that although the organization should have a fresh name and program, it is worth to prescribe 1.5 million members of the current PZPR in bulk.
The Liberals don't get the idea? Why?
Rakowski felt that to last under fresh conditions, under the force of “Solidarity”, 1 must have... a mass, not just a sculpture – that is, quite a few people. However, the crew centered around Kwasniewski, Leszek Miller and Sławomir Wind combined differently: to preserve what can be done, besides with the assets of the party, but without these hundreds of thousands of old companions, who will simply cover the various reformers, social democrats and another "liberaries" with caps. Hence, their thought to conduct a democratic election of delegates for the final convention in the PCR.
Rakowski bought it and as a consequence managed to choice many comparatively young activists. The average age at the XI reunion was about 15, possibly more than the average age of members of the PZPR. Additionally, the July 8 movement activists passed almost everyone, so they were overrepresented to their real strength in the ranks of the party. This is why we managed to make a "social democratic block" there and rather easy push through the name and programme of the fresh organization – the Sociallemocracy of Poland. Although quite a few these delegates might inactive not know what this social democracy actually means...
Is Kwasniewski's efforts to control the fresh organization based on something more than that breakthrough you mentioned at Round Table?
Kwasniewski had already gained the fame of a man who, despite his young age, co-created the success of the circular Table, but inactive became acquainted there with Michnik, Kuron and Geremek, i.e. icons of the another side. Who else would be able to talk to those people? And theirs to give that they are democrats and truly want reform? Thus, even if many activists seemed besides forward in terms of symbolic break-up with the legacy of the PZPR and fraternization with "solidarities", they nevertheless considered that only in the Olku hope. And Kwasniewski, aware of these moods, but besides the influences of the old apparatus, made clever political blackmail: if you want me to be the leader, it's OK, but there must be at least 60 people on the SdRP ultimate Council that I'm going to point out.
Kwasniewski was poorly embedded in the old-new organization camera, not as Miller, then the man number 2 in the party. But this sixty – the list almost on the knee, during the break of the gathering was written by Nałęcz with Siemiątowski – strengthened his influence.
Let us bend a small over the long duration of "a harsh friendship," over its roots. What was the difference between the 2 politicians, Miller and Kwasniewski?
This is simply a textbook example of parallel career paths in PRL: through a organization camera in Miller's case and through student movement, press and government at Kwasniewski. Miller finished the competition, the method school, then the organization school and got a higher education, and Kwasniewski did not, but the second was the icon of educated reformers, a student-intelligent man. It was his strength and weakness – strength in terms of favorable public image, abroad contacts, acquaintances among media elites and in the "Solidarity" camp, while the disadvantage was weak rooting in the apparatus, in organization ranks. In this respect Miller beat him to the head.
How was the SdRP founding congress?
On the basis of the “translator”: the gathering of the 11th Congressional Assembly – with an crucial speech by Rakowski, who announced that he would not search leadership – was suspended. Immediately afterwards, the founding legislature of the fresh organization was opened in the same place, where the statutes were passed and the name of the Polish Social Democrats was adopted. Then her congress... was suspended, and the deliberations of the 11th PZPR convention were suspended, which adopts a resolution on the transfer of assets just before the fresh organization was formed and a resolution on self-solution. The second is voted out, the contestants sing sad International, Rakowski with his throat squeezed says “associates and companions, the banner of the Polish United Workers' organization to decision out”, the reunion closes, after which... the founding legislature of the SdRP is suspended. And that's where they're choosing Kwasniewski and his sixty.
All of this takes respective days, and on the way there is inactive a group of Tadeusz Fiszbach, the alleged Social Democratic Union, who declares a complete break with the legacy of the PZPR, i.e. movable and immovable property.
How did this liberal faction imagine the future of the party? Relations with the ROAD environment and the Democratic Union, not to mention more to the law, did not encourage optimism erstwhile it came to accepting post-communists as a "normal" party?
The SdRP people were prepared for a long march, and Mieczysław Rakowski himself, raising a toast with Kwasniewski and respective of his colleagues at the end of the SdRP reunion, predicted: for your success, possibly in 15-20 years this left will be on its feet. There were many unknowns, e.g. the issue of the preservation of the assets of PZPR, money and real estate, but besides the strength of force on decommunization, vetting, etc.
How many members does SdRP have at the start?
At the founding congress, the list was signed by over 1,200 people from over 1,600 delegates for the last PZPR convention. In the end, there were about 1.5 million people in the PZPR, including respective tens of thousands who were truly curious in the future of the party. In the first months, 5-6 1000 members joined the SdRP, mainly the erstwhile PZPR. A figure of 50–60 1000 was then given, but it was false or, as Aleksander Kwasniewski said at the premiere of the book, "political alternatively than statistical". Zbigniew Siemietkowski admitted after years that 1 zero was added in authoritative declarations, for fear of public embarrassment.
While the SdRP inactive existed for almost a decade, she only competed erstwhile in the election under this name.
Yes, in the first local elections in Poland, late spring 1990. The consequence was obtained weak, in elections to municipal councils only 3% with a piece. It is actual that Jacek Raciborski besides included in his investigation those committees that had changed, in short – erstwhile comrades from the PZPR, who performed without the SdRP sign – and he totaled over 9%. This was the strength of the SdRP brand and the strength of its close structures.
The question is, is that a lot or a little? Especially as the next elections are coming, possibly even more crucial erstwhile it comes to "counting."
In the late fall of 1990, Poles were to elect a president – strangely enough, in direct elections, as Lech Wałęsa wished. In this situation Leszek Miller argued that it was Kwasniewski as president and the most celebrated face of SdRP that should take off.
And that was the last thing he needed?
He made a deal with Vladimir Cimoszewicz, who became MP on the PZPR list in June 1989, but bypassing the “one” in his district, so in a sense he was not a organization man. Additionally, he was a superb and substantive speaker, after the resolution of the PZPR even president of the club of the erstwhile PZPR, the alleged Parliamentary Democratic Left Club. He did not join the SdRP, so he was doing for this “decent commuch” who was able to harshly criticize his own environment, until any point even sympathized with Fishbach...
A Didn't Kwasniewski just fear for a weak score? He had stronger reasons for this than today's possible candidates and left-wing candidates who besides like not to get active in pre-lossal projects.
Miller He plotted that if the president's score was good, it would be thanks to the SdRP, which would run for him, and if weak, it would be Kwasniewski's fault. He besides always emphasized that the party's name should be worn with pride, not hide it or be ashamed of it.
In turn Kwasniewski felt that the expression of the left was worth expanding as much as possible. The SdRP should be its core, but it should not be identical with it – it would let a small warming of the image that it is not only heirs of the PZPR, but besides unionists, anti-clericists, etc. This would besides weaken the comparative power of the "miller" camera. Cimoszewicz was perfectly suited to cross this route: this is the candidate of the “all left” supported by the SdRP, but besides by another environments. This made it easier for the solidarity left to be divided into supporters of Wałęsa or Mazowieckie.
30 years later, we call it the "social side candidate". I don't think she's strong then.
These another environments were plankton. On the another hand, OPZZ, many and best organized on the non-solidarity side, played completely kunktatorski. The union leader did not believe in Cimoszewicz's good score, so he supported both Cimoszewicz and Mazowieckie just in case. Nevertheless, the election came above expectations due to the fact that Cimoszewicz got 10 percent. He defended the biography of people associated with the Polish People's Republic, criticized the increasing influences of the Church and the first social costs of the transformation, and to what will be crucial in subsequent years, he was the only 1 who did not support Lech Wałęsa in the second circular against Tymiński State.
To cut off the reforms? To prosecute a plan to be a strong opposition?
Cimoshevich said that his constituents have their minds and will not tell them who to vote for. He understood that the erstwhile PZPR-ers hated Wałęsa, but Tymiński will shortly wear out, and any of his electorate, frustrated by changes, anti-Balcerowicz, will be available. At the same time, this decent consequence of Cimoszewicz showed that the expression of the wider election coalition, SdRP with various additions, sounded increasingly credible.
And so was the Alliance of Democratic Left.
In February 1991, or 3 months after the election, Kwasniewski and Cimoszewicz compose in the Tribune a manifesto for the election coalition of all left-wing forces. As you read it, it is hard to get attached to something, the program is simply social democratic: criticism of economical policy from the point of view of labour interests and against monetaryism, anti-clericalism, right to abortion, secularity of the state... Under specified a banner there were more and more environments, although without the left solidarity – it was far besides early for that. The then formed SLD was truly pluralistic: there were people from anticlerics and feminists through cooperatives to rather many trade unions from OPZZ and ZNP. Of course, SdRP activists dominated, but they did not dominate absolutely.
It's the exact other of what the right is doing at the time.
The right and center were fragmented, mainly due to the ambition of their leaders, and the SLD a decent but not a sensational consequence in the 1991 elections to the Sejm gave as much as second place, behind the Democratic Union. If you add to this the fatal ordination without the electoral threshold, through which there were 29 clubs in the Sejm, and besides the alleged war on the mountain, in which the solidarity side took a sharp hold of heads – then Kwasniewski could stand on the bank of the river and watch the bodies of enemies drain it. At that time, a very unsuccessful government, Jan Olszewski, was created, who, without the majority needed, decided to leave with a bang. And he unleashed a wave of accusations by various politicians about being agents that hit the solidarity camp the most. His part joined forces to halt this action...
Balcerowicz, Mazowiecki, Wałęsa, Kaczyński, Olszewski, Korwin-Mikke – an extraordinary coalition to strengthen the post-communist faction.
And the SLD could already be set up as not so much defenders of the heritage of the Polish People's Republic, but as advocates of pragmatism, interaction, dialogue.
Warm water in the tap...
Almost; Poland has specified large problems to solve, specified historical challenges... European integration, unemployment, failing establishments, poorness in the countryside, while “Solidarity” is breaking among itself and the clergy is pansy. The support lines have grown. And Kwasniewski skillfully laundered: he attacked another government, Hanna Suchocka, for dogmatic liberalism in economical policy, and at the same time any SLD MPs voted in favour of privatisation programs. alternatively a minority, including Kwasniewski: but it always happened strangely that these 8 or 10 MPs in 50 were adequate for the bill to pass. marketplace reforms were moving forward, the SLD benefited from their social impact, and Kwasniewski could show voters that they had real pluralism in the SLD.
On this subject, the right-wing writer Igor Zalewski published in 1995 a very good, respectful text about post-communists and Kwasniewski. He wrote, among another things, that solidarity parties "played democracy like children in the paddling pool." Their politicians resented each other, and erstwhile they had taken offense effectively, they established a fresh organization against old colleagues. In turn to the SLD, he utilized a comparison to anglers who go to the lake, have different fishing rods, different baits, fish in different places of this lake. Everyone has their own way, their own fish patent. Everyone thinks his is the best, but he doesn't head the others fishing their own way. As a result, fish – that is, voters – go to the common basket and everyone is satisfied.
Forgive any naivety of the question, but in this context, however, looking through the prism of his full political path: was Kwasniewski even to any degree an thought politician?Did he have any ideas that he would not lay on the altar of current politics?
If we were to look for any nucleus of his worldview, which has survived various changes in the economy, it would most likely be modernized occidentism. In another words, moving Poland to the West as possible in the given conditions; after 1989, the adaptation of the organization to the conditions of liberal democracy, capitalism and integration with the West became an element. erstwhile Kwaśniewski pushed for SdRP's support for Poland's entry into NATO, he did so initially with considerable opposition of any of his colleagues – specified people as prof. Tadeusz Iwiński or diplomat Władysław Konarski thought alternatively in terms of Poland's "finalization" and then about safety architecture in Europe based on OSCE, alternatively than the North Atlantic Alliance.
Although there have been even more skeptics in the SLD coalition since the fall of 1993, that is, in PSL: 1 of its leaders had to drink at a hotel of parliament to ask, "gentlemen, but on the ch... us this NATO"?
What about the voters? European integration, as well as "to be or not to be" in NATO, is the subsequent origin of the orange revolution, the war in Ukraine, what is happening present in Georgia. Just after the russian Union dissolved, the course west wasn't that obvious, was it?
So-called concrete grinding, as Kwasniewski utilized to say, that is to say, to bring formations to the standards and requirements of Western capitalist democracy, lasted fundamentally until 1995, until the presidential election. The SdRP expressed a strong position on the substance as early as 1993, but voters had to be persuaded much longer. In another words, this active a certain electoral risk, especially this more provincial intelligence of the Polish People's Republic of Poland or erstwhile activists of the Polish People's Republic of Poland – these "large places" were much easier to control to liberal-technocratic and at the same time powerfully pro-Western.
And where is this rule of defending the secularity of the state by SLD or SdRP, at least in the first period? You're reading now Notes Wajdy, Julek Kutyła, too, and he told me that in them 1 can see how elites on the circular Table enter into the pathos of solidarity and church. Is this just an effort to fill the niche, to play on the counter, or is this a more natural legacy of PZPR?
There was barely any competition for fishing to stick to Zalewski's metaphor. These solidarity politicians, whom we would expect, if not straight anti-clericism, then at least the liberal-Świecka option, focused mainly on the Democratic Union, around Tadeusz Mazowiecki and someway subjugated this "religious pathos". Yes, Barbara Labuda protested against the expansion of the influences of the Church, Olga Krzyżanowska or Jacek Kuroń voted more pro-Świecko – but that's about it. However, among the millions of erstwhile members of the PZPR, but besides in the ranks of the erstwhile opposition, especially this urban opposition, there was a anticipation of a secular or even world-neutral state policy – e.g. maintaining women's right to interrupt pregnancy, but besides opposition to the introduction of religion into schools.
The dominance of the Church’s “Solidarity” politicians due to the false feeling that the Church is fighting Russian governors, however, was huge, which shows Marcin Kościelniak Abortion and democracy. With whom could the then, hard and free left build an alliance for secularism?
These post-solidarities that could represent a secular part of society have concentrated in the Labour Union. It was a organization of secular intelligent people with social democratic economical views, but never "two figures". She had recognizable, respected characters in the ranks – Ryszard Bugaj, Wiesława Ziółkowska, Tomasz Nałęcz, but they had 7–8 percent, mostly concentrated in large cities. Kwasniewski did not go to the frontal fight with the Church, his attitude towards the clergy was much more conservative than Danuta Waniak or Izabella Sierakowska, let alone the line of the weekly weekly “No”. He felt that the SLD could not simply be against the Church, since almost all of Poland is behind...
You mean any kind of political conformism?
This can be interpreted as the submission to mainstream, the desire to delight the uni-democratic elites, the newspapers, etc., but it was surely crucial for him to believe that the post-PZPR, precisely due to the past, is less, besides less, in relation to the Church; that we cannot be so anti-clerical, due to the fact that we have our ears behind the ears of the communist era.
In retrospect, it is increasingly evident that erstwhile it comes to relations on the PZPR-Church line in the Polish People's Republic, it was alternatively unnecessary self-criticism.
Yes, but there was another reason: Kwasniewski always stresses that 1 of the 2 positions he actively applied for in his life was the chairmanship of the Constitutional Committee of the National Assembly. He then very much wants to be the father of the Polish Constitution, but he besides knows that 2 thirds of the full National Assembly must be in charge of this, and far-reaching compromises are necessary.
If you look at the first draft constitution submitted by the SLD before the 1993 elections, and then recommissioned in the fresh term, it was very secular, very left-wing – and virtually nothing was left of it. Kwasniewski was ready to give way to the Democratic Union and then the Union of Freedom in many cases, due to the fact that he knew that he needed its votes; in turn, the war with the Church wanted to avoid due to the subsequent referendum.
The war for the constitution lasted longer than the "cutting of concrete" on entering NATO.
It was yet won due to the fact that the constitution was passed in 1997 and citizens supported it. The question is, were all these compromises – e.g. the dilution of the state's secularity evidence – essential for this? It is clear to the University of Warsaw that these were concessions in exchange for support, but with the Church the substance is more complicated. due to the fact that despite talks, negotiations, softening liberal records – the hierarchs were opposed anyway, as were the pro-ecclesiastical AWS by Marian Krzaklewski, who fought against the draft constitution to the very end.
If the task were more left-wing, would the Church fight it more? Would the majority be missing? We will not answer this question today, but we know that the constitution in the referendum passed a tiny margin, with low attendance. Anyway, in that case the submission to the Church was not due to purely organization interest – on the contrary, Kwasniewski gave the organization legitimacy in 1995 after the election of the President.
This long march, which the founders of the SdRP founded at its beginning, was amazingly short, for 3 years. Today, it's alternatively unimaginable.
In 1993 Kwasniewski could not know that the SLD would shortly form a government – parliamentary elections themselves were held early and a small by chance. And on their eve, he assumed that he would win first place, due to the fact that so the polls said, but it would be alternatively strong opposition – no 1 could foretell that until 4 right-wing letters would fall under the threshold and 30 percent of the vote would be wasted. Although he has a majority to make a government, Kwasniewski then resigns from the premiere.
He doesn't want to lead the government? Like in 1990 – run for president?
He thought that it was besides early for that, that society little than 4 years after the fall of the Polish People's Republic was not ready for the prime minister from the post-communist circle. Did he want to be Prime Minister? Sure, as humanly and privately, he wanted – but he rapidly accepted that the Prime Minister's seat would be taken by Pawlak. A smaller coalition from the PSL pretended rather effectively that it had nothing to do with post-communism, Pawlak besides preferred Wales. The president realized that he could rise a competitor, due to the fact that Kwasniewski, standing aside and reviewing the government, would not consume himself – but he did not presume that he would start in 1995.
This is where the consciousness of “Olku, you must” emerge?
According to Rakowski's journals, any of Kwasniewski's colleagues were convinced of his launch in late 1993, and a year later Józef Oleksy, erstwhile asked about the anticipation of his own start, he was expected to answer that "Olek had already booked it a long time ago". It was surely easier for him, since he was not in the government of the small liked prime minister – he could shine against his background and not take work for the government.
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And why did specified a young, promising, but experienced folk politician not bargain the hearts of Poles and coworkers?
The government itself had not bad ratings, and it enjoyed a good economical situation, but at the same time Pawlak was badly communicating: he was irritated by journalists, the spokeswoman was hired by Miss Polonia Ewa Wachowicz... Plus, he was a very difficult, problematic partner: he avoided contact with coalitionists, he did not keep his word – the legend went through history, as he established with the SLD the composition of the common government, and then, going with the list of ministers to Belvedere, he deleted any names and entered others. Not to mention the fact that PSL was effectively displacing the nominally larger SLD from state positions. About a year after the ruling, in late 1994 they had had had adequate of him and the emissaries, and the media, and president Wales himself.
And they start fitting for his replacement?
Wałęsa hoped that he would replace Pawlak with Kwasniewski – the following year there were presidential elections, so it was worth getting active in everyday clashes with PSL and the president. Of course, Kwasniewski did not want to, and with the aid of him came... Pavlak. Desperately defending himself against the resignation, he proposed that Kwasniewski enter his government as Deputy Prime Minister, possibly that individual else from the SLD, e.g. Marshal of the Oleksy Sejm, be Prime Minister. He was convinced that Kwasniewski's ambition would not let this: how, to give his colleague specified a prestigious position? But Pawlak made a large mistake: SLD and Oleksy unexpectedly accepted the proposal, and Kwasniewski could take care of preparations for the fight for the Presidential Palace.
He believed he would win?
In the polls, he conducted regular, at least 1 year and longer before the election, and Wałęsa had terrible ratings. The president went to another wars with parliament that either didn't work out for him, or even erstwhile they left, it made a bad impression. He expanded his power, utilizing the ambiguity of the small Constitution with the aid of the celebrated prof. Falandish, but at the same time he increasingly disrupted the post-solidarity environment. After 1993, almost everyone, with the Kaczyński brothers, hated him there. All of this made the right without a clear, good candidate, but from the SLD point of view the most convenient opponent for them would be Wałęsa, as disliked, with a large negative electorate, seen as "unpresent." Plus, everyone else will be attacking him.
And what's the difference between the presidency then and the presidency today? Robert Krasowski in his volumes of past III of the Polish Republic points out Wa3ęsa as the most crucial policy of this period due to the perniciousness and attempts to build a strategy with a strong centre of power. And Kwasniewski wants to be president due to the fact that he likes to sail a yacht and watch the chandelier, or to rule?
The beginning of his word of office is the word of the tiny Constitution. Its provision that the president gives opinions to candidates for the MON, the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of abroad Affairs of Wales interpreted extending – i.e. that he de facto appoints them – and Kwasniewski inherited this inheritance from his predecessor. In another words, he was going for a beautiful strong presidency, not any chandelier.
And what did the media-institutional strategy look like at the end of the campaign? present we have strong identity media, we know about which station and editorial support which option. And then?
We had a more influential Catholic Church then than today, opposed to post-communist and liberals from the Union of Freedom, although it was not clear at first whether it would support Wales. There was a “Gazeta Wyborcza” whose journalists may have had different views, but Adam Michnik invented Jack Kuronia's candidacy for president, so the most influential Polish diary stood behind him. We besides have “The Life of Warsaw”, inactive with Tomasz Wołek at the head and the full battalion of the already known young right-wing journalists, who are surely anti-post-communist and will then support Lech Wałęsie. And we have respective another actors – specified as Polish Television, which is ruled by the alleged Pampers, and the president of TVP since March 1993 is Wiesław Walendziak; among journalists specified as Piotr Semka, Igor Janke, Cezary Michalski, the programme was besides broadcast. WC Quarter. In another words, the anti-communist right, though with the protestant snide.
And Polsat?
Zygmunt Solorz has lived well with everyone since the beginning, due to the fact that the concession for Polsat was granted by Marek Markiewicz, president of the National Board of Radio and tv – and he did so against Wałęsa. Polsat is then not an opinion-making tv in the conventional sense, but, what will be crucial in the election campaign, Polsat is “the tv of Poland B”. It means that it emits what large-town intelligence despises, for example disco polo music. celebrated Top 1 music video Ole, Ole! He's going to fly in Polsatovsky. Disco Relax.
And of course, there is the weekly "No" of Urban, which is known to support the post-communist candidate – and it is sold respective 100 1000 copies. The authoritative SdRP paper is "Tribuna", but its circulation and meaning are incomparably smaller. 1 could say that the media scenery is actually pluralistic, but with it I raised to the right.
While we're at disco polo – what was the uniqueness or innovation of Kwasniewski's run in 1995?
This is simply a very modern campaign, of course, individual will say that it was made "in American", but in a good sense: due to the fact that earlier in 1993, it was the Liberal-Democratic legislature that tried to make a run like those from the US, with the aid of Saatchi & Saatchi agencies, only that calculating US grips like cheerleading parades did not work completely. In the case of Kwasniewski's campaign, professionalism was alternatively a thorough designation of the local context. Sociologists and political scientists had plenty of data on the distribution of support after the 1993 general election in 1994.
There was no request to make polls from which politicians like Simon Holovnia could read whatever they wanted.
Yes, there are concrete results at the level of constituency, communes, towns, districts... Additionally, the SLD is already after 2 electoral victories, ergo has already developed structures across the country. In another words, he has people to do who will not only post posters and arrange a gathering room, but will besides supply cognition to the central staff. They'll get to the car 50 kilometres ahead of the target, and they'll fill the guy in on a fallen plant, holes in the road or a local scandal. So it is not adequate that the KWAK bus reaches places where no crucial politician has visited since the beginning of democracy, then the candidate knows what to say to people. The staff expects to mobilize voters where attendance is low – and events specified as Kwasniewski's arrival sometimes attract a quarter, a 3rd of residents. For this, the regions where this fight is doomed to failure, specified as Podkarpacie, Kaszuba and Gdańsk.
And the hiring of Jacques Segeli, a French political PR expert, was it truly a gamechanger?
In my opinion, his function is simply a small overrated, as if he had always figured out what was wrong. He was indeed a very experienced, recognizable not only in France political PR star, he collaborated with president Mitterrand, but also, for example, Chancellor of Austria. According to Danuta Wanik, he treated the possible second circular against Wałęsie as a professional challenge, and I think he was hoping that if he won, he could get Boris Jelcin into the campaign, which was scheduled for another year. The fact is, his function increased between the first and the second round.
Coach Kwasniewski says “you are the winner”?
He trained Kwasniewski from tv appearances, suggested different ideas for one-on-one debate with Wałęsa, and he surely came up with the thought of dropping a property message on his desktop in consequence to allegations about the “Polisa” action. Let us remind you that this was about not disclosing the shares of the insurance company purchased favorably by Jolanta Kwasniewska; the case “fired” before the “Life of Warsaw” elections, although many voters most likely did not realize what was going on. Throwing papers under his nose not only irritated Wa3ęsa, and so already agitated after the planned entrance of Kwasniewski at the last minute to the studio, but there was besides a staging of transparency: please, I have nothing to hide.
Why is it so important?
Because these 2 debates on TVP – about abroad policy and then about national – have immense ratings. Kwasniewski's advantage, especially in the first one, was overwhelming, and any of Wa3ęsa's reactions became iconic: from the offer of "giving the left leg" to "the master went in like a cattle and neither me nor be nor corn." They're all against him.
I must admit that I do not remember much from the debate before the elections on October 15, 2023, but already the 1 from 1995, seen as a seven-year-old, I know amazingly well.
They were held in a alternatively circumstantial formula: candidates answered the questions of journalists invited by the another side. Kwasniewski was very brilliant. specified an example: erstwhile he got a question from Jan Nowak-Jezioranski about why he joined the PZPR shortly after the PRL Constitution entered the lead function of this party, he rapidly replied that erstwhile he actually joined the PZPR, he had no influence in the form of a constitution, but fortunately now he has. From these events, he learned 1 lesson: that the inclusion of the ideology of the Constitution ends badly for those forces who effort to make their ideology a law. It was an apparent allusion to the Catholic Church and work on the Constitution of Poland, in which the hierarchs demanded Invocatio Dei.
But his opponent, let's say, had 2 worse days.
Apart from being able to answer questions with different skills, he insulted journalists and Kwasniewski himself, complained to him, demanded an apology for his supporters, all of which did not make a good impression. He looked like a man who resented and resented the full world. In addition, the aesthetics of the studio, chosen by his staff, besides functioned against Wałęsa: for modern, modern-minimalist decor Noose as a gentleman with a mustache just didn't fit.
The second debate afraid national policy.
After the first, the polls were unambiguous and showed that Kwasniewski Wałęsa simply drove around, which was besides admitted by supporters of the latter. At the second meeting, Wałęsa made less mistakes, Kwasniewski did not have specified good mots, right-wing journalists were more demanding. Only 3 another crucial things happened in my opinion.
During the closing speeches Kwasniewski spoke very reconciledly, not to Wałęsa, but straight to viewers. Instead, Wałęsa told him: "With Bolshevik honesty, Aleksander Kwasniewski". Then the talker Wiesław Walendziak says that the results of the polls do not indicate which candidate has a better chance, but that 1 thing is certain: the biggest challenge for the winner will be to convince the half of the voters who did not support him. This clearly indicated the conciliation of Kwasniewski, not the confrontational Wałęsa. And then it was “neither me nor be...”, after Kwasniewski came to shake his hand.
Debates pave the way for Kwasniewski's victory. But then it came to this, as you say, “third turn.”
Because before the second circular comes the issue of a master's degree – in another words, the deficiency of a diploma of graduation, which he has declared many times, besides in authoritative documents. Kwasniewski's staff goes in this direction that the candidate does not have a diploma... but has a higher education due to the fact that he graduated. The right makes a notification to the prosecutor about the crime, but then lawyer General, Prof. Jerzy Jaskiernia of the SLD, keys, and fundamentally plays on time. He's commissioning an expert at the Ministry of National Education on... the definition of higher education. present we know that not only the master's thesis was missing, but besides respective exams, but in the second circular Kwasniewski won by nearly 650 1000 votes.
But inactive after the election, until December 10, the situation was very tense.
More than 600,000 electoral protests were submitted, and the action primarily animated NSZZ “Solidarity” and Radio Maryja, then supporting Lech Walesa. The ultimate Court utilized respective expert opinions, their pronunciation was vague, a separate conviction happened – but it was yet considered impossible to prove that the "overreach" of education added adequate votes to the candidate's victory. However, this gigantic denial – before himself and friends, due to the fact that Kwasniewski's staff was as amazed as any voters – was very costly for Kwasniewski. Transparents specified as “ave master!” or declarations of writing him a diploma in social activity persecuted him for a long time, and the scandal undermined his authority. And even the “coaching night” with colleagues in Spain, after the second round, did not taste as good as it could.
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Michał Sutowski – Politologist, postgraduate of MISH University College, translator, journalist. associate of the Political Critic squad and the Political Critic Institute. Author of political biography Alexander Kwasniewski, co-author of river interviews with Agata Bielik-Robson, Louisa Wujec and Agnieszka Graff. He writes about political economics, the upcoming EU apocalypse and more. He talks. Long.
