Jakub Majmurek: On October 15, the list of the Left on the 1 hand lost over 460,000 votes compared to the election 4 years ago, on the another hand, after nearly 2 decades of break fresh Left (the erstwhile SLD) returns to power. Is the left side glass more half empty or half full?
Rafał Chwedoruk: This is 1 of the hardest questions to ask about this year's elections. It is surely optimistic that for the second time in a row many young voters voted on the Left, which the SLD utilized to only dream about, even in the elections in which it was most successful. The advantage is that the fresh government cannot arise without the Left (New Left, due to the fact that there will be no Together in the Government – ed.).
The failure of votes is definitely a downside, but besides the fact that – if we look deeper into the results – the left saw the biggest losses this year, where it could number for more than average support: in Lubuskie, Wielkopolska, Łódź, West Pomeranian. The decline in support was peculiarly evident in Kalisz and Piotrków Trybunalski – cities where the left traditionally did very well, which lost to Buzek's transformation and administrative reform, taking distant their provincial status.
The smallest losses were recorded by the Left in those regions where previously outside the fewer islands, and so did not play a peculiarly crucial political role. Which means that rival parties of the anti-script opposition have successfully reached left-wing voters.
How much does today's Left electorate have in common with that of 2005 or 2001?
The left has lost a large part of this electorate. Firstly, due to natural demographic processes. Secondly, due to the anti-script agenda – the electorate of the SLD was always susceptible to it, allowing it to be acquired by liberal parties.
Nevertheless, despite the declines I mentioned, the Left was inactive better usually in places where it was always strong. 1 of the better results was achieved in the Dąbrowski Basin.
By ‘Lithuanian effect” which was rather a circumstantial phenomenon.
Yes, but it spread all over the Basin and the “Austrian” Jaworznie.
New to fresh campaigns, including 2023, is that the Left is doing well in metropolitan areas, which previously were alternatively a weak side of the erstwhile SLD – in Warsaw, Krakow, Wroclaw, etc. Everywhere there's quite a few inflowing young people, students and more.
The October 15 election was the last in which the old SLD electorate played an crucial role. In turn, the young electorate that the Left gained in these elections does not should be faithful to it. Especially in the context of presidential elections which naturally lead to polarisation, and for young voters the Left Rafał Trzaskowski will be a much more attractive option than Donald Tusk.
However, the biggest problem for the Left is that, even with the most optimistic explanation of the result, it has inactive not settled its strategical dilemmas about who it wants and what it can be – it is in this respect in precisely the same place as before the 2019 election, only with a worse election result.
What precisely is the dilemma?
If I were to usage a geographical metaphor, I would say that the Left in Poland inactive did not decide whether it wanted to be the left 1 that functions – or alternatively does not function – in Turkey or Israel, or as in Latin America.
On the 1 hand, the Left could effort to last in politics as a progressive party, representing the most progressive part of the burgher electorate, a fresh mediate class – like the Greens in Germany, to bring us closer to a democratic example. In Turkey, which I mentioned, the left-wing organization is formally the organization of the thought heirs of Atatürk, the Republican People's Party. She has an electorate mainly in the richest parts of Turkey, enjoying the top support from the large cities in Izmir – the most Europeanized Turkish city.
Going through a progressive organization would mean giving up many keynesism demands and beginning up to liberal solutions accepted middle-class voters, a postmodern alternatively than enlightened agenda, alternatively than a state of prosperity.
On the another hand, fresh Left may set itself up as a defensive organization wellfare state, representing little prosperous citizens focused alternatively outside large centres, skeptical of part of the progressive agenda, inclined towards what we would call populism, distrustful of the modern planet and in many respects attractive to the right.
Which option would be better?
There is no easy solution to this dilemma, all choice is at risk, everyone needs compromises. Since Blair and Schröder's manifesto and left-wing helplessness to the large financial crisis of 2008, this is simply a universal dilemma, present worldwide. In many places it rips apart leftist parties, social democratic parties and more.
There are many indications that the German Die Linke will fall. The organization first turned in a progressive direction, but as a consequence a group of activists headed by Sahra Wagenknecht, who will build a more populist alternative. Earlier, the same dilemma led to the fall of a sitting corner on a barricade between liberalism and the populism of Czech social democracy – and erstwhile it was the largest organization in the Czech Republic. In turn, Hungarian post-communists followed a road akin to the Polish SLD, towards a liberal one, and present they can vanish completely politically.
An example of a populist strategy would be the Slovak SMER Robert Facy?
Or Romanian post-communists. They do not have any peculiarly left-wing economical agenda, but like Fico in Slovakia, they base their support on poorer regions of the country. The most votes are collected in Voloszczyz and in western Moldova, regions which gained a large deal during the dictatorship of Ceaușescu and lost importantly during the period of systemic transformation. Flirts with any conservative demands combined with a moderately left-wing economical programme and strong anti-elitism form the political identity of the Romanian left. The question of whether in Poland anything like this would be possible at all with specified a emergence in many aspects of the left with the liberal camp.
This dilemma of the fresh Left will be applicable for decisions on filling positions in the fresh government. due to the fact that the question will besides arise as to how much you can agree to a permanent blur in a liberal-democratic camp, and how much you can effort to scope the electorate periphery PiS, curious in social policy alternatively than cultural agenda, especially this fresh date – specified as LGBT+ issues.
The fresh Left did not manage to win much in the coalition agreement – this shows her weakness in the fresh arrangement?
The question itself sets out the framework for answers. While the election consequence of the left-wing list can be regarded as ambiguous, for example, in the context of unprecedented attendance so far, it makes fresh Left-wing a weaker partner towards the remaining entities of the fresh coalition.
If fresh Left had told Tusk no, the government would have no majority. Was there political space for that?
No, I don't think anyone would understand. The fresh Left would thus follow the way of today's forgotten post-Solidarity left from the Second Parliament, from 1993-97, erstwhile a group of MPs of the Polish Socialist organization stepped out of the SLD club and the Labour Union – with a difference of 1 vote on the party's board – decided not to enter the SLD-PSL coalition. Both groups yet had to join the SLD, no 1 understood the meaning of left-wing opposition to the centre-left government.
The same would be actual today, due to the fact that no substance how much it has to do with reality, the Tusk Government is seen socially as a centre-left government. The only thing fresh Left can do in this situation is act as a reviewer of government policy within it and act sectorally through the ministries that will receive it, thus trying to implement part of its agenda.
What resorts should fresh Left fight for?
The Ministry of Digitization has no importance for the fresh Left. The only number that should be curious in the fresh Left is the 1 from which her polls will begin. On the another hand, it could be a good chance to include a ministry of social policy or national education.
The erstwhile would give an chance to scope older voters, from poorer regions, as well as to support any young voters – for example through housing policy. I think the problem of housing crisis for the younger generation of the fresh Left has been diagnosed very well in the last campaign.
MEN would in turn let to scope the budget. This is the possible electorate of the fresh Left, although it is worth adding that the budget is identified in Poland in the majority as a mediate class. At the same time, the electorate is economically linked to public institutions and expects at least stableness if not to improve its employment conditions.
The Civic Platform has long been working on support from this electorate, present there are old neoliberal concepts of the liquidation of the teacher's card – but Nowa Lewica could fight for it not only by raising higher wages, but besides by raising working conditions, empowering teachers – mainly with parents, which is simply a large problem in Poland today. fresh Left could besides become a HiT gravedigger, the Ministry of Education gives space to articulate its own historical policy, and this, not only in Poland, is an crucial component of politics.
However, in order to usage these resorts, Nowa Left would gotta show considerable skill by learning to play out for its benefit the cracks and conflicts in the Liberal camp. A akin equivalent had to be performed in the last 8 years, during the period of polarization of the PiS-PO. She truly competed with the Platform, but had to do so constantly highlighting her maximum distance to the PiS. And it kind of worked out. Now the fresh Left must be no little flexible than the SLD in the 1990s. – who could be both a improvement organization and a protest party.
Above all, however, the fresh Left must find a vehicle that allows it to last until the next crisis of capitalism. After Rywin's affair, specified a vehicle proved to be the structures of the SLD, which allowed to last even time outside the parliament. Now a mechanics is needed to last to a fresh solstice erstwhile the anticipation of expanding the electorate appears.
A major economical crisis will be essential in order to possibly benefit the full parliamentary Left? Is it not adequate to have a political crisis linked, for example, to the increasing problem of Kaczyński succession? Wouldn't that trigger a polarization more beneficial to the Left?
It's a long way to go. Although in a year Trump will not win the election again, PiS will be in the top crisis in its past and will be forced to fight to stay the second main division force.
However, the position of the structural crisis of the Law and Justice Union has already been adopted by the 3rd Road – Kosiniak-Kamysz and Holovnia clearly want to enter the place that the Law and Justice Union will release, attract any of the voters of the right. Although the PiS electorate is not uniform, it is besides subject to secularization processes, which could make a parliamentary Left chance – if it could scope the voters who are far from it age, spatially and even due to age have different aspirations than liberal forty-year-olds representing the Left in the Sejm.
Before Parliamentary Left, 3 electoral campaigns: local, European and presidential. Will they be difficult?
The 2018 local government election, over 1 million votes and 6% support in voting for the voivodship seymists saved the left in Poland. They showed that the SLD could be a partner for the Civic Platform, that although the Alliance was outside the parliament, it inactive has discipline on the electorate's election.
In 2024, however, it will be a much harder election. The conventional SLD electorate will play an increasingly smaller function in them, many local fresh Left structures have long remained in alliance with the PO. The presidential elections will be even more difficult, there will most likely be a dilemma whether it makes sense to put out your own candidate or it is better to support Trzaskowski immediately. At this point a lot will be decided – for example, whether Nowa Lewica will not yet melt with the Liberal camp, to the point that in 2027 she will compete for the Sejm from 1 list with him. Among the Polish elites, since 1990, there has been a very strong temptation to make a two-party or two-block strategy and the left would be the first victim of specified an operation.
Robert Biedron said that Nowa Lewica had put on the table a proposal for a joint launch of the “democratic block” organization in the following local elections – as I realize besides the provincial Seymites.
This best shows where the left is today. And the origin of these problems is not so much a weak consequence but unsolved strategical dilemmas.
Today, however, in Poland, the left does not have area for a large strategy, but for tactical maneuvering to last the next structural crisis of capitalism.
He is inevitable, just look at debt ratios of economies like American or Chinese – although here we may not know all the real indicators. The question is how much the Polish left will benefit from it.
So far, in the midst of crises around the left, it gained in 2 moments: first at the beginning of the crisis, erstwhile people were looking for individual to halt it, who gives hope that the old good planet could inactive be saved. This was the case in the early 1970s, even in Britain and Germany. However, as the crisis continues, selfishness increases in society, liberal reasoning about the economy begins to triumph. Right hand wins. However, erstwhile the crisis subsides, social aspirations begin to grow rapidly and the left gains – even in Poland in the 1938 local elections.
It is crucial to scope specified moments with working structures, policy tools, a correct social diagnosis.
In the context of all this, how do you measure the decision together to support the Tusk Government but not enter the government?
For today, it was their only move. Voting against the government would mean a political end together. In turn, entering the Tusk government could shake the organization from within. Many activists wouldn't understand. The organization would lose the attraction of an perfect policy reviewer, who can besides be a certain capital. Thanks. Total circumstantial position The media will watch the organization vote, will be curious in its position on various issues.
However, in the long term, the organization will most likely be sentenced to effort to embrace a resort. It could be a government crisis or a reconstruction of the cabinet. Motivation is more powerful in politics than frequently powerless reviewers – the second triumph of the Law and Justice in 2019 showed this strongly. So sooner or later, if not on a government level, then on a self-government level, the organization will gotta take work for any part of social life.
In the situation of the solstice we were talking about, could we come up with an thought for a fresh polarization? Sometimes 1 hears the opinion that the future of Polish politics is polarization Together-Confederation.
Maybe that's the future among young people in large cities. But in addition, in Poland there will be more many than the youngest, millions of pensioners. The Left in Poland fought for decades to break free from the patch of the organization of grey nostalgics of the erstwhile system, the organization of retired officers of the People's Polish Army. present it is mostly distant from this, has a mostly young electorate. But paradoxically, erstwhile she's got it now, she has to fight back for the next generation of seniors. due to the fact that it is worth remembering that, for example, the SPD is ruling in Germany present mainly due to the fact that it has secured the support of retired people from the erstwhile GDR.
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Rafał Chwedoruk − political scientist, habilitated doctor of humanities, associate prof. of the University of Warsaw.
