An example of the Western “liberating” crusade, and in peculiar the United States, shows how pragmatic, due to the fact that peace-oriented and coexistence-oriented the doctrine of safety can dominate expansive ideology, justifying the happiness of another nations by instilling façade democracy, enforcing the Western imagination of human rights and introducing the market-based “free American”.
It derives from centuries-old strivings to impose upon the full planet a strategy of values, having its sources in Judeo-Christian and Roman-Hellenistic ideas of leadership, historical mission, missionaryity and proselytism. The Western sense of the request to convert heretics and schismats and cultural-religious superiority was born at the end of antiquity, when, after the death of Emperor Theodosius in 395, the Roman Empire fell to the east and west. In his essay “Kruciata – the essence of Western culture” Wroc3aw writer wrote about this in a colorful way Radosław S. Czarnecki.
The victims of assaults and humiliations by Western Crusaders were not only innounists, but besides Christians themselves, especially Orthodox ones in the East. The memory of the harm suffered by them has survived in a form mythologicalized to modern times, which is why the endemic conflict between East and West is inactive in the same railways, even though ideological and systemic conditions are changing.
Our closer traditions of “save” the planet on the way of crusades and conquests by Western powers date back to the mediate Ages and the colonization era of recently discovered territories. Civilization advantages gave Europeans technological weapons to conquer and subdue abroad peoples, and Western Christianity, through the function of Papacy, gave these processes a stamp of legitimacy. The combination of power and ideology formed the basis for the education of a permanent intellectual stream, occurring in the political reasoning of Western powers, to which the attributes of “ideorealism” can be attributed.
This word originally introduced by the French author and diplomat Paula Claudela (1868-1955) meant ‘full fantasy fluctuations (breakdown) between ideas (idea) and reality’ (Hermann Wiesflecker). He referred to the Habsburg politics, trying to reconcile, as Roman-German emperor Maximilian I (he served this function from 1508 to 1519), idealistic notions of missionaryity and imperial greatness with pragmatic administration and peaceful coexistence. The essence of the idearealism in its historical form was to defend the hierarchical order of the world, based on the subjection of tiny nations to a strong hegemon, which yet ended with the dissolution of the Habsburg Empire.
The word "ideorealism" should be adapted to the contemporary realities of the Western world, which is experiencing a discrepancy between maintaining its privileged political and economical position, with simultaneous promotion of multiculturalism and ideological expansion into fresh geopolitical spaces. This phenomenon leads to the demolition of Western civilization.
In the case of Poland, idealism means the immanent contradiction of the doctrine of east politics, based on the belief of a peculiar civilization mission and cultural attractiveness, contrary to its own realization and efficiency. The problem is that Poles have never built specified a power possible to be able to permanently control abroad lands. They were guided by the disastrous beliefs about the expected brotherhood of the peoples, building a false communicative of the “forum” before the barbarians of the East. This usually resulted in a terrible defeat, which is simply a bitter testimony.
Not reaching for the expeditions of Swedes or Germans against Russia, it is worth looking at Poland's participation in this historical process. The ideas of spiritual crusades and ideological missionaryism in the East were born during the reign of the Jagiello dynasty. The Catholic Church's participation in the baptism of pagan Lithuania was 1 of the most crucial motifs of the union of the Crown of the Kingdom of Poland with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. It gave the anticipation of economical and political expansion, as well as modeling imperial power in a systemic sense in the vast east and central European space, based on the cultural preponderance of the nobility. This was accompanied by the polonization of local cultural and economical elites, as well as the building of imperial identity, though in fact specified terminology associations were avoided at the time. The name of the empire was not utilized due to the fact that it aroused negative connotations. The name of the Republic of Both Nations sounded proud, but innocent, though unfair to the 3rd cultural component – Rusins. In Polish literature only the French Daniel Beauvois presented a actual image of this country, without idealizing relations in it ("Ukrainian Triangle". Nobility, Carat and People in Volyn, Podol and Kiev 1793-1914", Lublin 2005).
Reminiscences of the Jagiellonian Age...
and the birth in Polish geopolitical reasoning of the Promethean thought influenced the politics of the reborn Republic after the dissolution of the possessive powers. In projects to recreate the large spatial statehood, 2 concepts clashed: corporateism (Roman Dmowski and National Democracy) and federalism (independence lioness and belved camp around Józef Piłsudski). no of them have been implemented in practice. First of all, there was the awakening of nations, building their identity, most frequently in opposition to the legacy of the erstwhile Republic. Lithuanians, Belarusians and Ukrainians chose their own ways of development. At the time, the aversion and even hostility to Polish order caused many dramas in the interwar period, and mainly during planet War II. The consequence of these events is polonaphobia, present present among east neighbours, but Polish decision-makers and mass media effort not to announcement it. Polish protectionism is associated with erstwhile subjection and dominance. There is no longer a "Lord Poland", but intellectual opposition to Polish pretensions to lead the region has not expired.
When post-war Poland found itself in satellite dependence on the USSR, ideas for fresh affiliations with the East were developed primarily in the emigration environment (ULB concept Juliusz Mieroszewski, voiced in the Parisian “Cultures”). There was quite a few idealism in them, and the national interests of east neighbours were mistakenly identified. This is peculiarly evident with respect to Belarusians who, after the dissolution of the USSR, did not succumb to anti-Russian phobias and are closer to Moscow than to Berlin or Brussels. Lithuania and Ukraine, on the another hand, were among the most militant states in the Western border with Russia.
The Polish ruling elites in the III Republic did not draw any lessons from the failures of the Jagiellonian thought and its derivatives, nor from the unfavorable attitudes of the societies of neighbouring states. east Crusades brought Poland a regress of civilization and, as Roman Dmowski stated, allowed the German regulation to be strengthened in the erstwhile Piast lands. Who knows if today's focus on conflicting Russia is simply a distraction from how fine-tuning Germany holds its dominance in the region?
One of the historical achievements after planet War II became national-ethnic and confessive cohesion of Poles. It has long been known that the presence of abroad national elements is neither conducive to consolidating society around power nor to building loyalty to the state. Meanwhile, in the fall after the Jagielloan idea, dreams about the union of Poland with the Ukrainian state are revived in our eyes, regardless of its geopolitical condition and ideological orientation. This is simply a task of large hazard due to the fact that there are no nonsubjective reasons behind it. It is the consequence of false diagnoses and hints, coming from the circles of Anglo-Saxon states, who are committed to exploiting the possible of Poland and Ukraine to face Russia.
The implementation of specified plans is supported by the awakening of anti-Russian resentations and obsessions, demonstrated primarily for public use, although it can be assumed that many politicians are lit up by a spark of unrest and possibly confusion, erstwhile Poland meets with a shoe of Kievn authorities all day and shocking ingratitude.
One must truly have no political reason not to see that the penetration of Poland on all levels of social life by visitors from Ukraine will origin conflict of both national elements sooner or later. It must not be forgotten that both in the east and western areas Ukraine grew up to be a natural rival of geopolitical Poland. Therefore, active lobbying for Ukraine's admission to the Euro-Atlantic structures (European Union and NATO) is nothing more than acting against itself.
Such conclusions are prompted by the so-far policy against Poland on the Ukrainian side. 1 of the most sad ones is the heroization of historical policy by the prism of honoring the CNS and UPA as the most crucial national-exemptive organizations. Just after the President's speech Bronisław Komorowski in April 2015, the ultimate Council of Ukraine adopted a bill on the position and worship of veterans of the flag organizations, there was a grain crisis and flooding Poland with Ukrainian goods that did not meet EU standards, and on his canava Kiev's complaint to the planet Trade Organization in connection with the embargo and attack Zelenski Volodymira in the UN, that Poland is favouring Russia.
There are many indications that various dramatic cognitive dissonances will deepen in Polish-Ukrainian relations in the future, but the rulers will pretend that they do not harm the Polish side. It is clear that Poland is governed by the peculiar "coalition of blind and fools", aimed at making Ukraine happy at the expense of its citizens. A legitimate question arises where there are limits to social patience and erstwhile the instinct of self-preservation and the impulse of mass protest and rebellion against harmful politics will awaken among Poles.
Dogmaticism of hatred of Russia...
led Polish politics to a dead end and resulted in maximum limitation of the field of manoeuvre. Ukrainian authorities are well aware of this irrational determination of the Polish partner in the face of conflict with Russia and are doing a lot to usage Polish naivety to maximise their position among Western countries. Poland is treated instrumentally and with claims. Zełenski, despite the war, is simply a major figure in the salons of Washington, London, Paris and Berlin, which makes Polish self-righteous and convinced politicians small to think about.
The vulnerability of subsequent III Polish government teams on the influence of the “first Ukrainian” is simply a phenomenon without precedent in history. The paradox is that by investing in immense aid to the Ukrainian regime, Poland does not receive much in return. The façade and hypocritical relationship of the ruling elites of both countries leads to social confusion. We are dealing with intellectual blackmail. Against its own interests, the Polish State has undertaken to pay a advanced tribute, which it cannot and cannot retreat from.
However, more and more voices are being heard that the assistance given to victims of war in Ukraine cannot take place at the expense of their own society. The lifting of oncological treatment in Poland or the rescue of the condition of Polish message should be a precedence for the ruling, who under the force of Western protectors joined the “party of war” and enlisted in the destructive “service of Ukraine”. This is simply a disgraceful example of not being liable for your people.
The dedication and renunciation of Poles to Ukraine will shortly go into oblivion erstwhile the country, as militaryly strongest in the region, puts on its own expansion, trying to regain control of the territories which it considers ethnically Ukrainian land (so-called Zakerszona, west of Curzona line). By losing the Russian-speaking provinces of the east government in Kiev, it can put any form of compensation in the west, at the expense of Poland. Does it not happen to anyone in the Polish government that respect for the boundaries set by Stalin after planet War II is now giving way to revisionist tendencies, not only in the russian space? The break-up of Yugoslavia and the cut-out of the "syphern" Kosovo by Western powers have shown that the West can cynically act against global law.
In the atmosphere of combating Russian influence, the function of agent, sabotage and diversion activities by Ukraine is lost from sight. Even among the top friends there is simply a constant rivalry of intelligence services and there is simply a rule of limited trust. So why do Polish politicians treat the Ukrainian neighbour with specified assurance and understanding, whose interests are in many places contrary to the interests of Poland? Why do they not want to see the tremendous risks they pose to their own citizens? Politicians come and go, but their decision mistakes leave permanent harm to national welfare. Today's political reality besides shows how hard it is for any of the erstwhile decision-makers to take legal work for the wrongs they have done.
The mancament of political reasoning is to escape causal analysis. Politicians of all formations do not see that there has been a misconception of the "strategic partnership" in relations with Ukraine at the heart of the conflict with Russia. That the activity of Polish diplomacy in the time provoked by the Western services of subsequent social uprisings in Kiev (during the "Orange Revolution" and Euromaidan) restored in Moscow the image of Poland as an inciter to anti-Russian activities. It was besides crucial to affect Polish services in organizing protests against the election of Alaksandra Lukashenka as president of Belarus in 2020.
Ideoreism as a false ideology...
He one more time obscured realistic assessments of his own aspirations and their feasibility. Worse still, he caused specified an increase in the activity of the president and Government after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine that any proposal to suspend the war effort and conclude the peace agreement was torpedoed with their participation and veto of the British. Various media reports from the West show that Poland is increasingly blamed, that its fierceness contributed to the escalation of war on a very dangerous scale. And in these efforts he does not intend to remainder until a mad expedition to Moscow, at the price of the blood of his soldiers. This is served by an intrusive and tiring pro-war tromtadration.
The case of Ukraine shows that it was targeted by the US immediately after independency in 1991. Then the American strategists Zbigniew Brzezinski They began to think intensively about "the management" of the russian space. Depriving Russia of influence in Ukraine was meant not only to undermine its imperial status, but besides to wipe out its "libido domindi", its will and motivation to dominate another countries. Poland was very well answered by specified a philosophy. Governmental elites, frequently lacking initiative and professionalism, rapidly began to show peculiar zeal in building anti-Russian obsessions.
Russia fell into a deep collapse at the time and was weak adequate and demolished by the proatlantic reformers that it could not defy creating conflicting strategical visions. In addition, the U.S. thought of incorporating Ukraine into the Western safety strategy and the sphere of influence was encouraged by efforts to convince Kiev to abandon atomic weapons in its territory. An interesting fact in this context is that the West had not yet had a hostile attitude towards Russia. Among the officials of the Department of State, or the U.S. Ministry of abroad Affairs, even the admission of all 3 east European republics – Ukraine with Belarus and Russia – to the North Atlantic Alliance was considered.
In the first half of the 1990s, a road map was created for American expansionism. The main thought was to destruct the alleged grey region so that its participants, or post-communist states, would not again fall into a network of Russian addictions. However, it is subject to the condition of "democratisation" and the possible adoption "in the long term". Time showed how much they were honest commitments, and how much meaningless emptiness they were.
In most countries of Central and east Europe, therefore, they fell into the trap of perfect realism. By confronting Russia, they submitted to external protectors on a scale unprecedented in history. Polish governments, regardless of their provenance (solidarity or post-communist) were fascinated by the imagination of a fresh crusade, darkening minds with desire and wishfulness. Their own ideas of a permanent weakening of Russia are based on the external guarantees of the Western "omnipotent" and taking on the function of provokers and "goers".
Against the background of this insane ideology, the war in Ukraine with all its tragic consequences, including the threat of escalation and the engagement of the Polish army, should be a dramatic informing and an alarming informing to the political elite. There are limits that must not be exceeded. The most crucial thing is the concern for the peaceful continuation and continuity of the generation of Poles, so frequently and thoughtlessly bled out in history.
Prof. Stanisław Bielen
Think Poland, No. 27-28 (30.06-7.07.2024)
